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Notes
A QUEST FOR FAIR AND BALANCED:
THE SUPREME COURT, STATE COURTS, AND
THE FUTURE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
REVIEW AFTER PERRY
CHASE D. ANDERSON†
Habit, rather than analysis, makes it seem acceptable and natural to
distinguish between male and female, alien and citizen, legitimate
and illegitimate[,] . . . black and white. But that sort of stereotyped
reaction may have no rational relationship—other than pure
prejudicial discrimination—to the stated purpose for which the
classification is being made.
1
– Justice John Paul Stevens

ABSTRACT
Gay rights advocates and social conservatives alike have criticized
the Supreme Court for its recent decisions concerning sexual
orientation. An examination of those decisions reveals that, taken
together, they represent a surprisingly careful balance. The result is a
principle of neutrality in which the Court has effectively demanded
that states refrain from taking either side in the culture war
surrounding sexual orientation. The true test of that neutrality
principle will arise when the Court considers the constitutionality of a
same-sex marriage ban. Thus far, challenges have taken place in state
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courts under state constitutions; those judges appear to have been
guided by their own assumptions and values rather than the Supreme
Court’s balanced approach. The federal challenge in Perry v.
Schwarzenegger may change the legal landscape. The district court
ordered a full trial—the first court to do so—and held, based on the
evidence, that the state constitutional amendment violated the U.S.
Constitution because it served only to disapprove of gay persons and
their relationships. This August 2010 decision provides an excellent
application of the Supreme Court’s state-neutrality principle and will
offer the Court the chance to weigh in on same-sex marriage.

INTRODUCTION
Gay rights advocates and social conservatives alike have
criticized the Supreme Court for being too sympathetic to the other
side in its recent decisions concerning sexual orientation. According
to two prominent gay rights advocates, the Court is not “leap[ing] to
2
defend full constitutional equality of gay people.” Vocal conservative
Justice Scalia, meanwhile, maintains that the Court “has largely
3
signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda.” Examining recent
Court decisions, both sides appear to be right, to some extent. How is
this possible? This Note examines these decisions and finds that
although the Court must decide “for or against” gay rights in
individual cases, its overall body of decisions represents a surprisingly
careful balance. That balance is enabled by a nod to each side. Under
one line of cases, employing a “more searching form of rational basis
4
review,” the Court has effectively prohibited the state from
5
disapproving of gay persons through its official acts. Under another
2. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Darren Spedale, Sit Down, Ted Olson and David Boies,
SLATE (May 29, 2009, 11:25 AM ET), http://www.slate.com/id/2219252.
3. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 580 (majority opinion); see also infra note 95 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Part I.A.2. This Note builds upon but makes a bolder claim than previous
scholarship. One excellent article that denies that the Court imposes state neutrality is William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes of
Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021 (2004). According to Eskridge,
Lawrence gives us nothing less than, but also nothing more than, a jurisprudence of
tolerance. This means that traditionalists can no longer deploy the state to hurt gay
people or render them presumptive criminals, but room remains for the state to signal
the majority’s preference for heterosexuality, marriage, and traditional family values.
Id. at 1025. Though agreeing that Lawrence established something of a middle ground between
gay rights advocates and traditionalists, this Note examines a larger body of the Court’s cases
and argues that under the framework these cases establish, the state cannot, without further
justification, codify a preference for heterosexuality or homosexuality. See infra Part I.
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line of cases, using established First Amendment doctrine, the Court
has struck down antidiscrimination protections for gay persons when
those protections intrude on private groups’ rights to disapprove of or
6
exclude others. The result is a principle of neutrality; that is, with the
convergence of both lines, the Court effectively has demanded that
7
the state refrain from taking either side in the culture war
surrounding sexual orientation.
The true test of the neutrality principle will arise if—or, more
likely, when—the Supreme Court considers the constitutionality of a
ban on same-sex marriage. The Court has not considered a gay
8
marriage ban since 1972, when it dismissed Baker v. Nelson “for want
9
of substantial federal question.” As one court aptly noted decades
later, however, “Doctrinal developments show it is not reasonable to
conclude [that] the questions presented in the Baker jurisdictional
statement would still be viewed by the Supreme Court as
10
‘unsubstantial.’” Nevertheless, most challenges to marriage bans
have taken place in the state courts, under state constitutions. The
balance that has guided the Supreme Court has not heavily influenced
state courts deciding same-sex marriage cases. Instead, those courts
appear guided by the judges’ own assumptions and values, resulting in
11
unnecessarily divisive opinions.
With no direct federal challenges brought since Baker, the
12
Supreme Court has thus far stayed out of the gay marriage debate.
The federal question was squarely presented, however, in Perry v.
13
Schwarzenegger, a 2009 challenge to California’s Proposition 8—a
ballot initiative that amended the state constitution to ban same-sex

6. See infra Part I.A.1.
7. This Note will use “culture war” to refer specifically to the social controversy over the
morality of homosexuality. It recognizes, however, that the term may refer to broader social
debates as well. Cf. Libby Adler, The Gay Agenda, 16 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 147, 149 (2009)
(“This part will recall the terms of just one of the culture war’s several frontiers: the battle over
progress in the treatment of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender (GLBT) people and the
status of same-sex erotic and domestic relations.” (footnote omitted)).
8. Baker v. Nelson, 292 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972)
(mem.).
9. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972) (mem.).
10. Smelt v. County of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861, 873 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (quoting Hicks v.
Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975)), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part, 447 F.3d
673 (9th Cir. 2006).
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. See infra notes 96–103 and accompanying text.
13. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
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14

marriage. After a full trial, the District Court for the Northern
District of California held Proposition 8 unconstitutional because it
could rationally serve no interest other than to discriminate against
15
gay people. The August 4, 2010, ruling may offer the Supreme Court
the chance to weigh in on same-sex marriage—and bring closure to
the debate in the courts.
This Note argues that the Supreme Court has struck the
appropriate constitutional balance between the two sides of the
culture war. It further argues that the state neutrality demanded by
that balance requires the recognition of same-sex marriage, as the
district court held in Perry. Part I examines the two lines of gay rights
cases in the Supreme Court since the mid-1990s and illustrates the
ways in which the Court has prohibited state laws that favor either
side. Parts II and III then apply that principle of state neutrality to
same-sex marriage. Part II looks at the ten state court rulings since
16
the Supreme Court’s 2003 landmark decision in Lawrence v. Texas,
identifying thematic problems with those state court rulings in light of
the Supreme Court’s neutrality approach. Part III then discusses
Perry, arguing that the extensive examination of the evidence during
trial—and the court’s ultimate determination that the California ban
served only to discriminate—was a necessary step toward laying the
gay marriage debate in the courts to rest.
I. THE SUPREME COURT STRIKES A NECESSARY BALANCE IN THE
CULTURE WAR
In public discourse, the debate over gay rights has occurred
largely within the crosshairs of two opposing sets of claimed rights:
gay individuals’ and same-sex couples’ claims to equal rights and
17
other individuals’ rights to disapprove of homosexuality. Beginning
14. California Marriage Act, Proposition 8 (2008) (codified at CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5).
15. See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1002 (“Here, the purported state interests fit so poorly
with Proposition 8 that they are irrational . . . . What is left is evidence that Proposition 8 enacts
a moral view that there is something ‘wrong’ with same-sex couples.”). See generally id. at 997–
1003 (applying rational basis review and rejecting the proponents’ asserted interests).
16. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
17. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE
CLOSET 295 (1999) (“With the advent of laws prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination,
religious liberty and sexual equality norms collide, and their collision entails a clash of
constitutional commitments—between the liberty of one group to exclude and the desire of an
excluded group for equal treatment.” (internal cross-reference omitted)); PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY,
THE SUPREMACISTS: THE TYRANNY OF JUDGES AND HOW TO STOP IT 46 (2006) (“What gays
now demand is public approval and government support for a lifestyle that others believe is
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in the mid-1990s, the rulings in the Supreme Court considering gay
rights have struck a careful balance between the two. Far from taking
an anti- or pro-gay stance on the diverse questions presented, the
Court has carefully developed an approach that leaves the sides of the
culture war free to vehemently disagree with each other, while
seeking to ensure that the state does not bring its considerable
influence to bear on either side. Accordingly, the Court has struck
18
down state actions that deny basic civil rights to gay people, while
also striking down laws that deny private persons or groups the right
19
to assert their moral viewpoints by excluding gays from their ranks.
Given the highly contentious nature of the culture war—fueled by
competing claims of liberty, equal rights, traditional morality, and
religious belief—the Court’s stance is the proper and necessary
equilibrium and should guide consideration of the constitutionality of
same-sex marriage bans.
A. The Debate Plays Out in the Supreme Court
1. Protecting Private Expression.
In three recent cases
implicating gay rights, the Supreme Court has considered the
potential collision course of antidiscrimination laws and private
organizations’ rights of free expression. The first was Hurley v. Irish20
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, in which a
unanimous Court ruled that a state could not force St. Patrick’s Day
parade organizers to include an Irish-American gay group in the
21
parade. The group had sued, arguing that the parade was essentially
a public accommodation and that the organizers were thus precluded
22
from discriminating under state law. The trial court agreed, citing
the parade organization’s generally nonexclusive criteria, and the
23
Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court
unanimously reversed, holding that, cohesive message or not, a
24
parade put on by private organizers is inherently expressive conduct.
immoral . . . . That amounts to the minority forcing the majority to license what it
disapproves.”).
18. See infra Part I.A.2.
19. See infra Part I.A.1.
20. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
21. Id. at 581.
22. Id. at 561–62.
23. Id. at 562–63.
24. Id. at 569; see also id. at 568 (“If there were no reason for a group of people to march
from here to there except to reach a destination, they could make the trip without expressing
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Accordingly, the organizers’ message—including their selection of
fellow marchers—is protected by the First Amendment, and neither
the government nor other organizations may interfere in that
25
decision. Whatever the organizers’ reasons for excluding the gay and
lesbian group, the Court said, “[I]t boils down to the choice of a
speaker not to propound a particular point of view, and that choice is
26
presumed to lie beyond the government’s power to control.” The
government’s motivation in preventing discrimination, the Court said,
would not justify the state’s intrusion into the right of a private actor
to control the content of its own message. As the Court explained,
“While the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of
harmful behavior, it is not free to interfere with speech for no better
reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a
disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the
27
government.”
The Court further elaborated on the range of protected
28
organizations in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale. There, it held that
although Boy Scouts of America was not typically engaged in overtly
expressive conduct—like a parade—and was not a religious
organization, the group’s message was protected by the First
Amendment. The case arose when James Dale, an Eagle Scout, was
kicked out of the Boy Scouts and terminated as a volunteer assistant
scout master after the organization discovered that he was “an
29
avowed homosexual and gay rights activist.” Although the Boy
Scouts asserted that the inclusion of Dale and other gay men as scout

any message beyond the fact of the march itself. Some people might call such a procession a
parade, but it would not be much of one.”).
25. See id. at 573 (“[T]his use of the State’s power violates the fundamental rule of
protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content
of his own message.”); id. at 569–70 (“[A] private speaker does not forfeit constitutional
protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes to isolate
an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the speech.”).
26. Id. at 575.
27. Id. at 579; see also id. at 581 (“Disapproval of a private speaker’s statement does not
legitimize use of the Commonwealth’s power to compel the speaker to alter the message by
including one more acceptable to others.”).
28. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
29. Id. at 644. Dale’s alleged activism included his position as co-president of the Rutgers
Lesbian/Gay Alliance; his attendance at “a seminar addressing the psychological and health
needs of lesbian and gay teenagers”; and an interview with a newspaper covering the seminar, in
which he advocated “homosexual teenagers’ need for gay role models.” Id. at 645. The facts of
the case imply that the Boy Scouts learned that Dale was gay from the published interview and
accompanying photo. Id.
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30

leaders would conflict with its message, the New Jersey Supreme
Court was not persuaded that its “message” included asserting that
31
homosexuality was immoral. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected that
approach. Consistent with its holding in Hurley, the Court noted that
associational rights long protected by the First Amendment “plainly
32
presuppose[] a freedom not to associate,” and emphasized that it is
not the role of the courts to conduct detailed inquiries into what
messages private groups seek to send and whether their chosen means
33
are sensibly related to disseminating those messages. That the
organization did not exist for the purpose of disapproving of
homosexuality did not deprive it of the right to exclude gays; it was
enough that the group’s asserted message might be altered by their
34
inclusion.
35
The third case, Rumsfeld v. FAIR, shows that the Court’s
protection of group expression has its limits. In FAIR, a group of law
schools protesting the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy
sought to invoke First Amendment protections in excluding military
recruiters from campus, or at least from the same level of access
36
provided to other recruiters on campus. Under federal law, any
school denying military recruiters the same quality and quantity of
access afforded to other recruiters would lose virtually all federal
37
funding. The group of schools challenged this policy as an
30. Id. at 644.
31. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1223–24 (N.J. 1999) (“We agree that Boy
Scouts expresses a belief in moral values and uses its activities to encourage the moral
development of its members. We are not persuaded, however, that a ‘shared goal[]’ of Boy
Scout members is to associate in order to preserve the view that homosexuality is immoral.”
(citation omitted) (alteration in original)), rev’d sub nom. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S.
640 (2000).
32. Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. at 648 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623
(1984)).
33. Id. at 651; see also id. at 653 (“As we give deference to an association’s assertions
regarding the nature of its expression, we must also give deference to an association’s view of
what would impair its expression.”).
34. Id. at 655; see also id. at 656 (“The Boy Scouts has a First Amendment right to choose
to send one message but not the other. The fact that the organization does not trumpet its views
from the housetops, or that it tolerates dissent within its ranks, does not mean that its views
receive no First Amendment protection.”).
35. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47
(2006).
36. Id. at 52–53. The Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy has since been repealed. See infra note
70 and accompanying text.
37. 10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (2006) (the Solomon Amendment); see also FAIR, 547 U.S. at 55
(“In order for a law school and its university to receive federal funding, the law school must
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unconstitutional condition on federal funds, arguing that the policy
violated their First Amendment rights under the same rationale as in
38
Hurley and Boy Scouts. In rejecting that claim, a unanimous Court
emphasized the lack of interference—real or perceived—with any
39
message the law schools sought to send or with their freedom-ofassociation rights. In part, this was due to the schools’ freedom to
sponsor protests against the military policy or otherwise voice their
40
disagreement, refuting any suggestion of support for discrimination
against gays and lesbians. The nature of the accommodation—for
example, allowing recruiters to meet with students on campus and
including their announcements with those of other recruiters in career
service emails—also was substantially different from inclusion in a
parade or as a leader in a private organization. The schools’ attempt
41
at comparison, the Court said, stretched too far; though the
protective wall around private organizational expression is high, it is
42
not absolute.
offer military recruiters the same access to its campus and students that it provides to the
nonmilitary recruiter receiving the most favorable access.”).
38. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 70.
39. Id. at 65 (“Nothing about recruiting suggests that law schools agree with any speech by
recruiters, and nothing in the Solomon Amendment restricts what the law schools may say
about the military’s policies.”).
40. Id. at 69–70.
41. Id. at 70 (observing that the comparison has the dual effect of “plainly overstat[ing] the
expressive nature of [the law schools’] activity and the impact of the Solomon Amendment on it,
while exaggerating the reach of our First Amendment precedents”).
42. More recently, the Court upheld another law school equal-access policy in Christian
Legal Society v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). Hastings Law School refused to recognize a
chapter of a national Christian organization that, in violation of the school’s antidiscrimination
policy, banned openly gay students from voting membership or leadership positions. Id. at 2979–
80. The parties entered a joint stipulation of facts, including a statement that the policy was one
of open access—for all groups and all students—rather than a specific policy banning groups
from discriminating based on sexual orientation. Id. at 2982. The five-member majority
accepted the stipulation as fact and held its content neutrality saved it. Id. at 2978. The fourmember dissent, authored by Justice Alito, refused to accept the stipulation as an accurate
description of the policy as Hastings had applied it and would have held that the policy’s actual
application violated the organization’s First Amendment rights. Id. at 3005, 3016 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
Because the majority let the stipulation govern, it is difficult to discern how the Court
would have ruled absent the “all-comers” policy, and thus difficult to take away any broader
legal principles from the case. Accepting the stipulation, one can readily attack the policy of a
law school requiring all student associations—including religious and partisan political ones—to
accept members and leaders who disagree with the groups’ core beliefs. But it is not clear the
Court has broken any new constitutional ground if one accepts the stipulation, as the majority
did; indeed, it appears roughly in line with the open-access principles in Rumsfeld v. FAIR.
Absent the stipulation, proper application of the neutrality principles discussed in this Section
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2. Protecting Against the Tyranny of the Majority. The Court’s
decisions give wide latitude to private organizations to determine
what message they send to the public about, among other things, their
views on homosexuality. Other decisions, however, plainly prevent
the state from taking a stand in its official actions. In Romer v.
43
Evans, the Court articulated “a commitment to the law’s neutrality”
44
concerning the rights of gay persons. At issue was Colorado’s voterapproved Amendment 2, which amended the state constitution to
45
prohibit the inclusion of gays and lesbians in antidiscrimination laws.
One effect of the amendment was to overturn ordinances in Aspen,
Boulder, and Denver that banned such discrimination at the local
46
level. Its additional effects were a point of contention between the
Justices. Justice Scalia, dissenting, found that Amendment 2 did no
47
more than deny gay persons “special treatment.” The majority,
48
however, rejected that contention and found that Amendment 2
“prohibit[ed] all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of
state or local government designed to protect the named class” of gay
49
persons.

and the next would have required the Court to strike down the Hastings policy. See id. at 2999
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he school policy in question is not content based either in its
formulation or evident purpose; and were it shown to be otherwise, the case likely should have a
different outcome.”). For a good critique of the decision, see John D. Inazu, Op-Ed., Siding with
Sameness, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), July 1, 2010, at 9A; and see also John D. Inazu, The
Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law of Freedom of Association, 43 CONN. L. REV. 149, 195 (2010)
(criticizing the Martinez majority’s acceptance of the law school’s “non-neutral policy
preferences” and its “failure to take seriously [the organization’s] freedom of association
claim”).
43. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
44. See id. at 623 (“One century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this Court that
the Constitution ‘neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.’ Unheeded then, those
words now are understood to state a commitment to the law’s neutrality where the rights of
persons are at stake.” (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting))).
45. Id. at 624.
46. See id. at 623–24 (noting that the local ordinances prohibited sexual orientation
discrimination “in many transactions and activities, including housing, employment, education,
public accommodations, and health and welfare services”).
47. Id. at 638 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 653 (“The people of
Colorado have adopted an entirely reasonable provision which does not even disfavor
homosexuals in any substantive sense, but merely denies them preferential treatment.”).
48. Id. at 626 (majority opinion).
49. Id. at 624; see also id. at 630 (“Amendment 2’s reach may not be limited to specific laws
passed for the benefit of gays and lesbians. It is a fair, if not necessary, inference from the broad
language of the amendment that it deprives gays and lesbians even of the protection of general
laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in governmental and private settings.”).
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On those findings, the Court could readily have made the case
about generally applicable political process rights, as the Colorado
50
Supreme Court had done, and struck down the law on that basis.
Such a disposition would have limited the holding to a narrow set of
cases and broken virtually no new ground for gay rights. But the
Court took the opposite approach, not only framing it as a gay rights
issue but also rebuking lawmakers engaged in animus-based
legislation. Purporting to apply the rational basis test, a highly
permissive standard of review, the Court held that “Amendment 2
51
fails, indeed defies, even this conventional inquiry.” The amendment
was “at once too narrow and too broad. It identifie[d] persons by a
52
single trait and then denie[d] them protection across the board.”
Given the broad disability placed on a narrow class of persons, the
Court read between the lines of the amendment, finding that it
existed to disparage gay persons, rather than to serve the state’s
asserted interests. The Court concluded, “Amendment 2 classifies
homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them
unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A State cannot so
53
deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws.”
The amendment at stake in Romer was, according to the Court,
unusual. But seven years later, the Court struck down laws targeting
gays that were widespread and heavily rooted in tradition: laws
criminalizing homosexual conduct. With its ruling in Lawrence v.
54
Texas, the Court held laws in thirteen states unconstitutional,
55
overruled its own precedent set by Bowers v. Hardwick —which
56
upheld a state’s right to criminalize same-sex sexual relations just
seventeen years before Lawrence—and ended the widespread
57
classification of gays as “presumptive outlaws.”
Those

50. Id. at 625 (“[T]he State Supreme Court held that Amendment 2 was subject to strict
scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment because it infringed the fundamental right of gays
and lesbians to participate in the political process. To reach this conclusion, the state court
relied on our voting rights cases and on our precedents involving discriminatory restructuring of
governmental decisionmaking.” (citations omitted)).
51. Id. at 632.
52. Id. at 633.
53. Id. at 635.
54. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
55. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
56. Id. at 191.
57. Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1022; see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 584 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“[B]ecause of the sodomy law, being homosexual carries the presumption of being
a criminal.”).
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accomplishments alone would have been quite a feat, but the Court
went further. The terms of the Lawrence opinion were hardly limited
58
to gay sex, as the contrary Bowers opinion had been. Nor was the
case decided strictly on privacy grounds, as it likely could have been
59
60
under the Griswold v. Connecticut line of cases, given that it
61
concerned intimate conduct within the home. Rather, the opinion
was about broader notions of liberty and equality—and why gays
62
were entitled to expect the same protections as straight people.
Sharply criticizing its prior holding in Bowers, the Court said that the
language of Bowers—and principally its characterization of the
claimed right—showed that the Court had failed
to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake. To say that the issue
in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct
demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would
demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about
63
the right to have sexual intercourse.

In both Lawrence and Romer, the Court flatly rejected the states’
claims that their laws were not targeting gays for disapproval but
merely furthering some legitimate interest through narrower means.

58. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190–91 (“[W]e think it evident that none of the rights
announced in those [right-to-privacy] cases bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional
right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this case.”); id. at 191
(“Precedent aside, however, respondent would have us announce, as the Court of Appeals did, a
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. This we are quite unwilling to do.”).
59. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
60. Cf. Adler, supra note 7, at 152 (noting that the now-discredited Bowers opinion
“admonished[ that] nothing in the privacy line of cases ‘bears any resemblance to the claimed
constitutional right’ asserted” in Bowers).
61. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562–63 (describing the facts of the case). Indeed, the opinion
began with a discussion of privacy in the home, which is all that would have been required to
decide the case. See id. at 562 (“Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government
intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in
the home.”); see also id. at 564 (“[T]he most pertinent beginning point is our decision in
Griswold v. Connecticut.” (citation omitted)). But the Court went on to explicitly extend the
holding. See id. at 562 (“Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more
transcendent dimensions.”).
62. See id. at 574 (“[O]ur laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing,
and education. . . . Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes,
just as heterosexual persons do. The decision in Bowers would deny them this right.” (citations
omitted)).
63. Id. at 567.
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The Court noted, for example, that the sodomy bans at issue in
Lawrence and Bowers “purport[ed] to do no more than prohibit a
64
particular sexual act.” The Court found that the actual effect of the
laws, however, was to deny gay persons the freedom to enter into
relationships of their choosing, and that “[t]he liberty protected by
the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this
65
choice.”
Lawrence is powerfully instructive in the state-private
dichotomy, not just because it struck down longstanding criminal
penalties for homosexual conduct, but also because of the reasons it
gave for doing so. The Court said that private beliefs, no matter how
deeply held, cannot justify state laws discriminating against gays:
The condemnation [of gay people] has been shaped by religious
beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for
the traditional family. For many persons these are not trivial
concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and
moral principles to which they aspire and which thus determine the
course of their lives. These considerations do not answer the
question before us, however. The issue is whether the majority may
use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole
66
society through operation of the criminal law.
67

The Court concluded that it may not. The Court reasoned that
“[w]hen homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State,
that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual
persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private
68
spheres.” This language went well beyond condemnation of the
criminal sanctions. Instead, the Court seemed to say that the real
problem with the sodomy laws was that they constituted
governmental action that invited discrimination against gay persons—

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 571 (emphasis added). See generally Céline Abramschmitt, Note, The Same-Sex
Marriage Prohibition: Religious Morality, Social Science, and the Establishment Clause, 3 FLA.
INT’L U. L. REV. 113, 144–47 (2007) (discussing the Court’s rejection, in Romer and Lawrence,
of preserving popular morality as a stand-alone rational basis for discrimination).
67. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The State cannot demean their existence or control
their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. . . . The Texas statute furthers no
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual.”); id. at 579 (reversing the lower court’s decision upholding the statute).
68. Id. at 575.
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and that such an invitation was extended whenever the state officially
characterized gays as immoral.
3. A Notable Exception. The Supreme Court refused to review
the military’s policy of excluding “out” gay persons from military
69
service, popularly known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Congress
70
repealed the policy on December 18, 2010. Courts, however, had
been reluctant to address the ban. The First Circuit upheld Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell in 2008 against due process, equal protection, and
71
free speech challenges. The Supreme Court refused to weigh in,
72
denying certiorari in the case. This may be seen as an exception to
the Court’s demand of government neutrality.
But Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell differs from the state laws challenged
in Romer and Lawrence in one important respect: its roots in claimed
military necessity. Historically, the Supreme Court has given
exceptional deference to such claims. During World War II, the Court
infamously held that the military’s claimed need for Japanese
73
internment overrode strict scrutiny; more recently, the same claim
has justified—under heightened scrutiny—exclusion of women from
combat positions and the requirement that only males register for the
74
draft. The First Circuit, in considering Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,
recognized the “unique context” of military policies and noted that
“[t]he deferential approach courts take” in reviewing challenges to
75
such policies “is well-established.” It concluded that, wise or not, the

69. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006).
70. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515
(repealing 10 U.S.C. § 654). The policy nevertheless remains in effect until sixty days after the
President and others certify that “the implementation of necessary policies and regulations . . . is
consistent with the standards of military readiness, military effectiveness, unit cohesion, and
recruiting and retention of the Armed Forces.” Id. § 2(b). For a good description of the repeal
and the response to it, see Carl Hulse, Senate Repeals Ban Against Openly Gay Military
Personnel, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2010, at A1.
71. Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 65 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009).
72. Pietrangelo v. Gates, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009).
73. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
74. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981); see also id. at 70 (noting that “judicial
deference to such congressional exercise of authority is at its apogee”); cf. United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 544–45, 555 (1996) (holding that a state military institute’s male-only
policy—not grounded in military necessity—unconstitutionally discriminated against women).
75. Cook, 528 F.3d at 57; see also id. (“It is unquestionable that judicial deference to
congressional decision-making in the area of military affairs heavily influences the analysis and
resolution of constitutional challenges that arise in this context.”).
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policy must be upheld because of that extraordinary deference.
Although not decisive in Rumsfeld v. FAIR, the Supreme Court
similarly emphasized military necessity—there, Congress’s interest in
successful recruitment practices—when it upheld the open-access
77
policy against the law schools’ challenge.
Even with a healthy dose of military deference, however, the
tides in the lower courts began to shift against the ban just months
before Congress repealed it. Within one month of each other, two
federal district courts held Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell unconstitutional
78
under the Due Process Clause.
B. Parallel to Free Exercise and Establishment Clause Principles
Although this Note does not argue that same-sex marriage bans
79
violate the Establishment Clause, there are useful parallels between
Religion Clause jurisprudence and the principles described here.
Taken together, the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause
are perhaps best understood as a strong principle of governmental
80
neutrality toward religion. To the consternation of some religious
groups, judges have ordered the removal of many signs of religion—

76. See id. at 65 (“Although the wisdom behind the statute at issue here may be questioned
by some, in light of the special deference we grant Congressional decision-making in this area
we conclude that the challenges must be dismissed.”).
77. See Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 67 (2006) (“The issue is not whether other means
of raising an army and providing for a navy might be adequate. . . . That is a judgment for
Congress, not the courts.”).
78. Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 929 (C.D. Cal. 2010);
Witt v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, No. 06-5195RBL, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100781, at *24
(W.D. Wash. Sept. 24, 2010). The Witt ruling followed the Ninth Circuit’s holding that Lawrence
required subjecting the military policy to elevated scrutiny. Witt, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100781,
at *2–3.
79. Other works have discussed the possibility of using this approach. See, e.g., Geoffrey R.
Stone, Same-Sex Marriage and the Establishment Clause, 54 VILL. L. REV. 617 (2009) (arguing
that the Court could use the Establishment Clause as one of several routes to strike down
Proposition 8 and other gay marriage bans).
80. See, e.g., Bernadette Meyler, The Equal Protection of Free Exercise: Two Approaches
and Their History, 47 B.C. L. REV. 275, 339 (2006) (“The Establishment Clause and Free
Exercise jurisprudence of the Court appears to be converging on a standard of neutrality—one
that accepts ‘neutral laws of general applicability’ regardless of whether they incidentally
burden free exercise and advocates only the ‘principle of neutrality’ in allocating benefits to
religious groups.” (footnote omitted)). Thomas Jefferson famously described the First
Amendment as “building a wall of separation between Church & State.” Thomas Jefferson,
Letter to the Danbury Baptists (Jan. 1, 1802), available at http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/
danpre.html; see also JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 760 (Library of Am. 1999) (describing the
separation of church and state as “[s]trongly guarded”).
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prayer, the Ten Commandments, and Christmas decorations, for
example—from the public square. Courts have, however, left intact
symbols that, taken together, do not endorse one religion or set of
84
85
beliefs over another —the “religious pluralism” approach, we might
call it. The Courts have also protected the rights of religious groups to
86
express their beliefs as they see fit. The result has been a neutral
87
state and a wide range of private choice. Establishment Clause

81. See Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294, 317 (2000) (holding that prayers
at public school football games violate the Establishment Clause); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 599 (1992) (holding that prayers led at public school graduation ceremonies violate the
Establishment Clause); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40, 61 (1985) (holding that a public
school’s “period of silence for meditation or voluntary prayer” violates the Establishment
Clause) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 60 (“Such an
endorsement is not consistent with the established principle that the government must pursue a
course of complete neutrality toward religion.”).
82. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 844, 881 (2005) (affirming a preliminary
injunction against a courthouse’s public display of the Ten Commandments); see also id. at 885
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“In my opinion, the display at issue was an establishment of religion
in violation of our Constitution.”).
83. See Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 578–79 (1989) (holding that a nativity
scene displayed on the steps of a county courthouse violates the Establishment Clause).
84. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691–92 (2005) (plurality opinion) (upholding a
state capitol’s display of many historical monuments, one of which featured the Ten
Commandments); Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 578–79 (upholding a city’s display of a
menorah, Christmas tree, and sign saluting liberty).
85. See, e.g., Richard M. Esenberg, You Cannot Lose if You Choose Not to Play: Toward a
More Modest Establishment Clause, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 65 (2006)
(“Government action becomes ‘practically coercive’ when it creates a substantial threat to
religious pluralism or of suppressing religious differences.”); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Essay,
Truth and Consequences: Mitt Romney, Proposition 8, and Public Reason, 61 ALA. L. REV. 337,
349 (2010) (describing religious pluralism in the United States).
86. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524, 527–
28 (1993) (holding that a prohibition on religious ritualistic animal sacrifice violates the Free
Exercise Clause); id. at 523 (“The principle that government may not enact laws that suppress
religious belief or practice is so well understood that few violations are recorded in our
opinions.”). The Court has held, however, that the state may enact religion-neutral regulations
that incidentally burden the free exercise of religion. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881
(“The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a
neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free
Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional
protections . . . .”).
87. See, e.g., Leslie C. Griffin, Fighting the New Wars of Religion: The Need for a Tolerant
First Amendment, 62 ME. L. REV. 23, 24 (2010) (“In modern Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, for example, the Court for many years identified ‘separation of church and state’
as its guiding principle and frequently applied ‘strict scrutiny’ to laws that burdened the right of
Free Exercise. Over time, however, dissatisfaction erupted with separationism’s perceived
hostility to religion, and the Court sought more neutral approaches to the Religion Clauses.”
(footnote omitted)).
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jurisprudence in particular recognizes the state as a potentially
coercive power in shaping others’ beliefs and in affecting the
88
treatment of minorities; accordingly, it demands that the state stay
89
out, so that others can determine their own religious beliefs without
90
coercion.
The Court’s approach to gay rights—demanding state neutrality
as to the morality or immorality of homosexuality—serves essentially
the same principles. It seeks to protect gay individuals from judgment
at the official level, while protecting the right of private individuals
and organizations to make those judgments themselves. As with the
Court’s Religion Clause jurisprudence, this approach removes state
coercion, thus creating a more level playing field than would exist if
91
the state were free to take sides.
In both contexts, the Court has taken a fact-based approach,
concentrating particularly on the practical effects of state actions and
claimed rights. Therefore, although a public accommodations law
protecting gay persons may be unobjectionable in general, the state
may not use it to force private groups to convey a message of
approval of homosexuality. An organization whose message is not
altered, however, may not receive similar First Amendment
protection. The state’s police power, broad though it is, cannot be

88. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 n.51 (1985) (“[T]his Court has noted that ‘[w]hen
the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious
belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing
officially approved religion is plain.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962))).
89. See Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 593–94 (“Whether the key word is ‘endorsement,’
‘favoritism,’ or ‘promotion,’ the essential principle remains the same. The Establishment Clause,
at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions of
religious belief . . . .”). It is worth noting that in individual cases, the Court is not always
completely faithful to this general principle. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Comment, Theology
Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes But Missing
the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 156 (2004) (arguing that, “from a perspective of substantive
neutrality,” state-funded scholarships for theology students should be constitutional and the
religious language in the Pledge of Allegiance should be unconstitutional).
90. See Laycock, supra note 89, at 244 (“Because government is very large, its influence
will rarely be zero.”); id. (“[R]eligious liberty is best protected from government influence by
nondiscriminatory protection of religious and secular private speech, and by government
making no statements that depend on views about religious truth. The Court has approached
this ideal in the speech cases; private religious speech is fully protected and government
religious speech is almost fully prohibited.” (footnote omitted)).
91. See, e.g., id. at 243 (“Minimizing government influence provides a criterion for defining
neutrality: government departs from neutrality when it does things that tend to influence private
religious choice.”).
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used to target gays and lesbians for disfavored treatment any more
than it can be used to favor them. As with cases under the religion
clauses, the Court’s preferred balance has boiled down to state
neutrality, and that neutrality depends on the circumstances of the
92
case.
II. THE FAILURES OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE REVIEW: STATE
COURT OPINIONS REPEAT ASSUMPTIONS AND DIVIDED BELIEFS
The neutrality approach developed by the Supreme Court since
the mid-1990s balances equal recognition of the constitutional rights
of gay persons with the rights of other individuals to disapprove of
homosexuality. As described in the preceding Part, the Court has
invalidated state bans on certain expressions of anti-gay sentiment—
93
in Hurley and Boy Scouts —just as readily as it has struck down laws
94
burdening the rights of gay persons. The balance is a careful one; in
both lines of cases, the Court thoroughly examined the facts to
determine whether the law furthered a legitimate state interest, or
instead served to promote or burden a particular side. Critical to that
examination was a somewhat more exacting level of scrutiny—on
display in Romer and Lawrence—that failed to accept an asserted
95
interest that did not appear to be supported by the facts.
The Supreme Court has yet to apply that command of state
neutrality to the most socially contentious gay rights issue yet: same96
sex marriage. The Court has not had occasion to consider the
constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans since 1972, when it
97
dismissed a challenge “for want of substantial federal question.”
Instead, the action has taken place in the state courts. Since 2003,
when the Court decided Lawrence v. Texas—widely regarded as the
92. See generally id. (describing the role of neutrality in religion cases).
93. See supra Part I.A.1.
94. See supra Part I.A.2.
95. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“When a
law exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a more
searching form of rational basis review to strike down such laws under the Equal Protection
Clause.”); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (“The breadth of the amendment is so far
removed from these particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit them. . . . It is a
status-based enactment divorced from any factual context from which we could discern a
relationship to legitimate state interests . . . .”); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (describing the Court’s analysis as “an unheard-of form of rational-basis review”).
96. Recent polls suggest that the nation remains closely divided over same-sex marriage.
See infra notes 111–12 and accompanying text.
97. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972) (mem.).
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turning point in the Court’s treatment of gay men and lesbians —
99
appellate courts in ten states have ruled on same-sex marriage bans.
This Part briefly considers the institutional role of courts when they
decide controversial issues. It then looks at the decisions of these ten
state courts and argues that they failed to fulfill that role. Instead of
serving the ideals of neutral factfinders, those courts largely took the
opposite approach, proceeding from the judges’ own values and
assumptions. This approach provides a sharp contrast to the approach
described in Part III, in which the federal district court in Perry v.
Schwarzenegger carefully reviewed the evidence presented after a full
trial.
A. The Institutional Role of Courts in Deciding Socially
Controversial Cases
This Note does not attempt to address the question of whether
courts should be deciding controversial cases in general. As a
100
normative matter, much literature has debated that question. As a
descriptive matter, courts do in fact take up the controversial issues of
101
102
103
the day—school desegregation, abortion, and flag burning, to
name a few. Though the Court has taken its share of criticism for
104
getting too involved, some of the cases most criticized today are

98. See, e.g., Marc Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1615,
1616–17 (2004) (“The recognition by the Supreme Court of the United States that lesbians and
gay men are human beings who have ‘dignity as free persons’ that is deserving of ‘full’
constitutional respect is itself a monumental breakthrough. Lawrence is the first Supreme Court
decision in American history that openly acknowledges this.” (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
578)).
99. Eight of the ten decisions came from the states’ respective courts of last resort. The
Indiana decision came from a three-judge panel of the state court of appeals. Morrison v.
Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. App. 2005). The Arizona Supreme Court declined to review a
decision by a three-judge panel of that state’s court of appeals. Standhardt v. Maricopa Cnty.
Super. Ct., No. CV-03-0422-PR, 2004 Ariz. LEXIS 62 (Ariz. May 25, 2004).
100. See Adler, supra note 7, at 150 (“Of course, in legal discourse, the whole idea of judicial
competence and its limits is routine.”); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, The Majoritarian Difficulty:
Affirmative Action, Sodomy, and Supreme Court Politics, 23 LAW & INEQ. 1, 6 (2005)
(“[C]onstitutional scholars have produced an enormity of scholarship analyzing the proper
function of the federal courts in a democratic society.”). See generally Hutchinson, supra, at 6
(describing theories of the role of the Supreme Court as a countermajoritarian body).
101. E.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
102. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
103. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
104. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support
Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279 (2005).
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105

ones in which the Court merely upheld the status quo. More to the
point, the Court has already shown itself willing to decide gay rights
cases and has established principles to guide its decisions in such
106
cases.
In controversial decisions—and in the case of same-sex marriage
specifically—legislatures and courts play vastly different roles.
Because legislatures are supposed to reflect the will of the electorate,
legislators’ main concern should be whether the people of their state
or region want legalized same-sex marriage. In contrast, courts are
not directly tied to popular demands. Federal court judges are
107
constitutionally insulated from outside control. Many state court
108
judges, meanwhile, are subject to popular election, but even in
elected states judges serve roles distinct from legislatures. The
Washington Supreme Court, for example, describes its role as
“protect[ing] the liberties guaranteed by the constitution and laws of
the state of Washington and the United States; impartially
uphold[ing] and interpret[ing] the law; and provid[ing] open, just, and
109
timely resolution of all matters.”

105. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548, 552 (1896) (upholding a law mandating
segregation based on race); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 139 (1872) (upholding a state’s
denial to women of licenses to practice law); see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
216, 223–34 (1944) (holding that although strict scrutiny was required to justify internment of
Japanese Americans, the government had met its burden based on military necessity).
106. See supra Part I.
107. Federal court judges are unelected, protecting them from popular demands, and they
receive life tenure and salary protection, protecting them from the other branches. See ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 4 (5th ed. 2007).
108. See id. at 4–5 (“In thirty-eight states, state court judges are subject to some form of
electoral review. Some contend that this difference makes federal courts uniquely suited for the
protection of constitutional rights.”) (footnotes omitted). Critics emphatically assert that state
judicial elections should be reformed or rejected precisely because existing electoral systems
weaken judges’ abilities to fulfill their intended roles. See, e.g., Editorial, Putting a Halt to
Judicial Elections, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/11/04/AR2010110407139.html (arguing that judicial elections should be rejected
because judges “should not be swayed by the political whims of the day, nor should they be
made to think twice about making principled but controversial decisions for fear that they could
lose their jobs”); Sandra Day O’Connor, Op-Ed, Take Justice Off the Ballot, N.Y. TIMES, May
22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/23/opinion/23oconnor.html (“When you enter one of
these courtrooms, the last thing you want to worry about is whether the judge is more
accountable to a campaign contributor or an ideological group than to the law.”). For a brief
discussion of Iowa’s judicial elections after the state supreme court found that gay marriage was
constitutionally required, see infra note 149.
109. Your Supreme Court in Action, WASH. CTS., http://www.courts.wa.gov/appellate_trial_
courts/supremecourt (last visited Feb. 8, 2011). Washington Supreme Court justices are elected
to six-year terms. Judicial Voter Pamphlet, WASH. CTS., http://www.courts.wa.gov/voters (last
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The results in gay marriage decisions do not reflect the courts’
unique institutional roles, however, as state court judges are split
roughly the same way as the electorate. In public discourse, the
debate over how—or whether—to legally recognize same-sex couples
is a close one. In a 2010 CNN poll, 48 percent of respondents believed
that homosexual relationships were “morally wrong,” 50 percent said
110
they were “not a moral issue,” and 2 percent were “unsure.” One
website collecting several nationwide polls revealed that between 44
and 52 percent of 2010 poll respondents believed same-sex marriage
should be legal, when the question posed a dichotomous choice
111
between legal and not legal. The results changed markedly when
civil unions were introduced as a third option, with respondents split
fairly equally across the three answers: supporting marriage, only civil
112
unions, or nothing at all.
State court judges are similarly divided. Between the Supreme
Court’s 2003 Lawrence decision and the California district court’s
2010 Perry decision, ten state appeals or supreme courts have issued
gay marriage opinions interpreting their own state constitutions. Of
those, five found that same-sex couples are guaranteed no formal
113
recognition of their relationships under their state constitutions,
four found that their state constitutions require recognition of same-

visited Feb. 8, 2011).
110. CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll, conducted Feb. 12–15, 2010 (surveying 1,023
adults nationwide), reported at http://www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm.
111. See CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll, conducted Aug. 6–10, 2010 (surveying
1,009 adults nationwide and finding, in asking two slightly different variations of the question,
that 49 or 52 percent of respondents believed in a constitutional right to same-sex marriage);
Gallup Poll, conducted May 3–6, 2010 (surveying 1,029 adults nationwide and finding that 44
percent supported same-sex marriage); ABC News/Washington Post Poll, conducted Feb. 4–8,
2010 (surveying 1,004 adults nationwide and finding that 47 percent of respondents supported
the legalization of gay marriage). All polls are reported at PollingReport.com, http://www.
pollingreport.com/civil.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2011).
112. See FOX News/Opinion Dynamics Poll, conducted Aug. 10–11, 2010 (surveying 900
registered voters nationwide and finding that 37 percent of respondents supported legalized gay
marriage, 29 percent supported another legal partnership, and 28 percent supported no legal
recognition); CBS News Poll, conducted Aug. 20–24, 2010 (surveying 1,082 adults nationwide
and finding that 40 percent of respondents supported legalized gay marriage, 30 percent
supported civil unions, and 25 percent supported no legal recognition). Both polls are reported
at PollingReport.com, http://www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2011).
113. Standhardt v. Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct., 77 P.3d 451, 463–64 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003);
Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 35 (Ind. App. 2005); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 635
(Md. 2007); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 22 (N.Y. 2006); Andersen v. King County, 138
P.3d 963, 1010 (Wash. 2006).
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114

sex marriage, and one found that its state constitution requires
awarding equal rights and benefits—through marriage or some other
115
institution—to same-sex couples. Despite the highly controversial
nature of the claims, all ten courts reviewed the constitutionality of
the bans strictly as a matter of law. None of the ten state courts held
116
full trials, and only one—the Iowa Supreme Court—had the benefit
of a developed evidentiary record, in the form of depositions and
exhibits submitted to the trial court before summary judgment, to
117
inform its decision.
B. State Court Decisions Fail to Reflect the Supreme Court’s
Balanced Approach
1. Courts That Rejected a Right to Same-Sex Marriage Simply
Deferred to the Legislatures’ Asserted State Interests. Courts in
Arizona, Indiana, Maryland, New York, and Washington all reviewed
the constitutionality of their states’ gay marriage bans as a matter of
118
law. The five courts that upheld their states’ bans all relied on the
same crucial assumptions—without any critical analysis—in rejecting
119
the plaintiffs’ claims under rational basis review. In defending their
laws, the states claimed that restricting marriage to opposite-sex

114. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub.
Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009);
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
115. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 200 (N.J. 2006).
116. See infra notes 118, 134–35.
117. See infra note 135.
118. See Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 454 (accepting special action jurisdiction without a trial);
Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 18 (affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint); Conaway, 932
A.2d at 584, 635 (reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the plaintiffs);
Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 5 (reviewing the trial courts’ grants of summary judgment and
affirming the appellate court’s judgment for the state); Andersen, 138 P.3d at 971, 1010
(reversing the trial courts’ grants of summary judgment for the plaintiffs). The dissenters on the
Maryland court recommended remanding the case for a trial on the facts rather than issuing a
decision as a matter of law. Conaway, 932 A.2d at 693 (Battaglia, J., dissenting).
119. The Washington court relied more heavily on the legislature’s freedom to make those
assumptions, rather than the court’s own insistence that they were true. See Andersen, 138 P.3d
at 983 (“The rational basis standard of review is ‘highly deferential to the legislature.’ As noted,
under this standard any conceivable set of facts may be considered that support the
classification drawn, and over–[ ]and under–inclusiveness generally does not foreclose finding a
rational basis for legislation.” (citation omitted)); id. (“We reiterate that the rational basis
standard is a highly deferential standard.”); id. at 984 (“And at the risk of sounding
monotonous, we repeat that the rational basis standard is extremely deferential.”).
Nevertheless, the same assumptions were at play—without any critical analysis—throughout the
opinion.
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couples served the states’ interests in fostering responsible
procreation and child rearing. The courts willingly accepted these
asserted interests, finding that the exclusion of same-sex couples was
rationally related to protecting the interests asserted for opposite-sex
120
couples. In agreeing with the states, the courts made two critical
assumptions, unsupported by facts: that the state-conferred benefits
of marriage are enough to cabin the allegedly irresponsible behavior
of heterosexual couples, and that same-sex couples would not benefit
from those same rights and benefits.
These courts’ first assumption defies common sense. All five of
the courts, in one form or another, found it important that
heterosexual intercourse—and not same-sex intercourse—may
121
naturally produce offspring.
The courts further found that
122
“accidents . . . happen” all too often among heterosexuals, and that
123
those accidents could be of particular concern to state legislatures.

120. See Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 463–64 (“We hold that the State has a legitimate interest in
encouraging procreation and child-rearing within the marital relationship, and that limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples is rationally related to that interest.”); Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at
35 (“[O]pposite-sex marriage furthers the legitimate state interest in encouraging opposite-sex
couples to procreate responsibly and have and raise children within a stable environment.”);
Conaway, 932 A.2d at 633 (“[T]he fundamental right to marriage and its ensuing benefits are
conferred on opposite-sex couples not because of a distinction between whether various
opposite-sex couples actually procreate, but rather because of the possibility of procreation.”);
Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7 (“[T]here are at least two grounds that rationally support the
limitation on marriage that the Legislature has enacted. Others have been advanced, but we will
discuss only these two, both of which are derived from the undisputed assumption that marriage
is important to the welfare of children.”); Andersen, 138 P.3d at 983 (“[T]he legislature was
entitled to believe that providing that only opposite-sex couples may marry will encourage
procreation and child-rearing in a ‘traditional’ nuclear family where children tend to thrive.”).
121. See Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 462 (“Indisputably, the only sexual relationship capable of
producing children is one between a man and a woman.”); Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 24 (“All that
is required is one instance of sexual intercourse with a man for a woman to become pregnant.”);
Conaway, 932 A.2d at 630–31 (“This ‘inextricable link’ between marriage and procreation
reasonably could support the definition of marriage as between a man and a woman only,
because it is that relationship that is capable of producing biological offspring of both
members . . . .”); Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7 (“Heterosexual intercourse has a natural tendency
to lead to the birth of children; homosexual intercourse does not.”); Andersen, 138 P.3d at 982
(accepting the legislature’s justification that only opposite-sex couples can create, without thirdparty involvement, children who are biologically related to the parents).
122. Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. See, e.g., Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 11 (“A person’s preference for the sort of sexual
activity that cannot lead to the birth of children is relevant to the State’s interest in fostering
relationships that will serve children best.”); id. at 21 (Graffeo, J., concurring) (“Since marriage
was instituted to address the fact that sexual contact between a man and a woman naturally can
result in pregnancy and childbirth, the Legislature’s decision to focus on opposite-sex couples is
understandable.”).
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The courts assumed that the state legislatures’ provisions of marital
rights and benefits would turn those instances of “casual
124
125
intercourse” into long-term, stable relationships. The courts’
hypothesized chain of events seems unlikely. It is hard to believe that
many persons engaging in the sort of casual sex described by the
courts—the people who don’t plan ahead, who conceive children
126
based on “momentary” fits of unprotected passion —would be so
motivated by the tax breaks and other state-conferred benefits of
127
marriage that they would enter into a permanent relationship with
128
their one-night-stand partners.
These courts’ decisions might be more persuasive if heterosexual
couples were the only ones bearing and raising children, but that is
not the case. The decisions thus also assumed that although gay
persons are parenting, they do not need the same incentives to stay
129
committed after they have children together. In contrast to their
accident-prone heterosexual counterparts, the assumption goes,
“[m]embers of a same-sex couple who wish to have a child . . . have
already demonstrated their commitment to child-rearing, by virtue of
the difficulty of obtaining a child through adoption or assisted
reproduction, without the State necessarily having to encourage that
124. Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted).
125. See, e.g., Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7 (majority opinion) (finding that the state could
rationally “choose to offer an inducement—in the form of marriage and its attendant benefits—
to opposite-sex couples who make a solemn, long-term commitment to each other”).
126. Id. at 21 (Graffeo, J., concurring).
127. See, e.g., id. at 6–7 (majority opinion) (describing “significant tax advantages, rights in
probate and intestacy proceedings, rights to support from their spouses both during the
marriage and after it is dissolved, and rights to be treated as family members in obtaining
insurance coverage and making health care decisions”).
128. This argument and its variations have drawn their share of critics. One critic called the
New York decision “desperate” and noted that the court apparently thought gays were “too
good for marriage.” Kenji Yoshino, Too Good for Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2006, at A19;
see also Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 31 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting) (“[N]o one rationally decides to
have children because gays and lesbians are excluded from marriage.”); Dan Savage, Same-Sex
Marriage Wins by Losing, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2006, § 4 (Week in Review), at 1 (“In New York,
the court ruled in effect that irresponsible heterosexuals often have children by accident—we
gay couples, in contrast, cannot get drunk and adopt in one night—so the state can reserve
marriage rights for heterosexuals in order to coerce them into taking care of their offspring.
Without the promise of gift registries and rehearsal dinners, it seems, many more newborns in
New York would be found in trash cans.”).
129. See Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 21–22 (Graffeo, J., concurring) (“Although many samesex couples share these family objectives and are competently raising children in a stable
environment, they are simply not similarly situated to opposite-sex couples in this regard given
the intrinsic differences in the assisted reproduction or adoption processes that most
homosexual couples rely on to have children.”).
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commitment through the institution of marriage.” The courts did
not attempt to explain why parents would have any less interest in
ongoing stability merely because their child was planned, rather than
an accident. As the dissent noted in the New York case, same-sex
couples in the state were already raising “tens of thousands of
children,” and “[d]epriving [those] children of the benefits and
protections available to the children of opposite-sex couples is
131
antithetical to their welfare, as defendants do not dispute.” Rather
than applauding same-sex couples’ child planning and providing them
132
with additional stability, these courts instead punished them for it.
The assertion that same-sex couples do not need any extra stability is
all the more perplexing given the propensity of gay marriage
opponents to attack gay couples as being unstable and thus unworthy
133
of marriage.
2. Courts Striking Down Gay Marriage Bans Assumed, Rather
than Showed, the Equality of Same-Sex Couples. The supreme courts
of Iowa, Connecticut, California, and Massachusetts all found that
bans on same-sex marriage violated their respective state
constitutions. Like the courts that upheld their states’ bans, these
courts considered the controversial question without the benefit of

130. Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 26 (Ind. App. 2005); see also Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d
at 7 (majority opinion) (finding that because same-sex couples, unlike opposite-sex couples, can
only “become parents by adoption, or by artificial insemination or other technological marvels,”
the “rationale for marriage does not apply with comparable force to same-sex couples”).
131. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 32 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
132. See Nancy C. Marcus, Beyond Romer and Lawrence: The Right to Privacy Comes Out
of the Closet, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 355, 422 (2006) (“The [Morrison] court rather
ironically concluded that, because same-sex couples who create families through artificial
reproduction or adoption ‘have invested the significant time, effort, and expense’ to do so, they
are more likely to provide a stable environment for their children without the protections of
marriage.” (quoting Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 24–25)); cf. Katharine T. Bartlett, Saving the
Family from the Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 809, 817 (1998) (“[A] reform that favors one
type of family by disfavoring another penalizes those who do not, and perhaps cannot, conform
to the ideal. When those wounded are the children on whose general behalf familystandardizing reforms are most often said to be justified, this consequence seems especially
indefensible.”).
133. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, A Response to the ‘Conservative Case’ for Same-Sex
Marriage: Same-Sex Marriage and ‘the Tragedy of the Commons,’ 22 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 441, 453–
55 (arguing that same-sex families are unstable, based on their higher divorce rates in countries
where they can legally marry); id. at 456 (“It does not appear that giving marital or marriagelike status to same-sex couples significantly alters their troubling behaviors.”).
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134

adversarial trials. Only the Iowa court had a developed evidentiary
135
record on which to base its conclusions.
The decisions involved two questions. The first was whether
same-sex couples had special characteristics that would justify the
state treating them differently than opposite-sex couples. The
Massachusetts court, the only state court that struck down a marriage
136
ban under rational basis review, held that “[t]he marriage ban works
a deep and scarring hardship on a very real segment of the
137
community for no rational reason.” In Connecticut, where civil
unions had existed since 2005, the state supreme court simply held
that the state’s contention that the two groups of couples were not
138
similarly situated “clearly lacks merit.” The court found that the two
139
had the same goals for their relationships and held that, in passing
the civil union statute, “the legislature itself recognized the overriding
140
similarities between same sex and opposite sex couples.” In
California, which also had a parallel equal-rights scheme, the court
141
reached a similar conclusion.
The second question was whether the creation of parallel-rights
schemes—civil unions or domestic partnerships—resolved the
constitutional infirmity. All four courts held that it did not. Two of
the states—Connecticut and California—had already enacted parallel
schemes. The Connecticut court found the difference between

134. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 403 (Cal. 2008) (noting that the trial court
“proceeded expeditiously to solicit briefing and conduct a hearing” on which it based its
judgment); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 411–12 (Conn. 2008) (reversing
the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the state); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862,
873 (Iowa 2009) (affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the plaintiffs);
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 951 (Mass. 2003) (reversing the trial court’s
grant of summary judgment for the state).
135. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 873 (noting that “[t]he record was developed through witness
affidavits and depositions”).
136. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961.
137. Id. at 968.
138. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 424.
139. See id. (concluding, without support, that same-sex couples “share the same interest in
a committed and loving relationship as heterosexual persons who wish to marry,” as well as “the
same interest in having a family and raising their children in a loving and supportive
environment”). The court neglected to describe any evidence that led to its assertion. Oddly, in
addition to quoting from the California case, the court cited the New Jersey and Vermont
cases—both of which held that only civil unions were constitutionally required—in support of its
holding that the couples were the same. See id.
140. Id.
141. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 413 (Cal. 2008).
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marriage and civil unions to be an “obvious fact.” Though a
discussion of evidence supporting its view could have been
illuminating, the Connecticut court eschewed that approach. Instead,
143
it cited Brown v. Board of Education for the proposition that
144
separate cannot be equal and moved on. Likewise, the California
145
court—despite the overwhelming length of its opinion —did
surprisingly little to explain why the separate name of domestic
partnership worked a harm of constitutional magnitude. It gave only
an unsatisfactory conclusion that domestic partnerships “properly
must be viewed as impinging upon the right of those couples to have
their family relationship accorded respect and dignity equal to that
146
accorded the family relationship of opposite-sex couples.”
Massachusetts, meanwhile, had no experience with civil unions,
and the court only addressed them in a second opinion, when it wrote
an advisory opinion to the legislature stating that parallel schemes
147
would not suffice. But its first opinion should have been clear
enough that the court demanded full marriage rights for gays:
Certainly our decision today marks a significant change in the
definition of marriage as it has been inherited from the common law,
and understood by many societies for centuries. But it does not
disturb the fundamental value of marriage in our society. Here, the
plaintiffs seek only to be married, not to undermine the institution
148
of civil marriage.

142. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 419 n.16 (“We do not see how the recently created legal entity of
civil union possibly can embody the same status as an institution of such long-standing and
overriding societal importance as marriage. If proof of this obvious fact were necessary, it would
suffice to point out that the vast majority of heterosexual couples would be unwilling to give up
their constitutionally protected right to marry in exchange for the bundle of legal rights that the
legislature has denominated a civil union.”).
143. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
144. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 418–19. The court also cited the California and Massachusetts
same-sex marriage cases for the same proposition. Id. (citing In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384
(Cal. 2008); Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004)).
145. The majority opinion alone spans seventy pages in the Pacific Reporter. In re Marriage
Cases, 183 P.3d at 384–453.
146. Id. at 445. The court then briefly described the uniquely celebrated term “marriage,”
but failed to give concrete examples—beyond conjecture—explaining why the plaintiffs would
suffer harm without access to the word alone. See id. at 445–46.
147. See Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d at 569 (“Segregating same-sex
unions from opposite-sex unions cannot possibly be held rationally to advance or ‘preserve’
what we stated in Goodridge were the Commonwealth’s legitimate interests in procreation,
child rearing, and the conservation of resources.”).
148. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 965 (Mass. 2003).
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The narrow majority of judges, in breaking new ground, should have
taken great care to describe specifically what led them to depart from
the tradition they acknowledge and to reach a different conclusion
than both the legislature and their dissenting brethren on the court.
They failed to do that.
149
The Iowa court’s opinion contained the strongest reasoning. It
described the role of the legislature respectfully, but detailed times
when the Iowa legislature had gotten it wrong, and—rather
150
forthrightly—when the U.S. Supreme Court had blundered as well.
The beginning of the opinion called the case a “civil rights action”
and placed the case in a historical progression of equal rights
movements, contrasting historical discrimination against various
151
groups with Iowa’s avowed commitment to equality and liberty. It
reviewed the positions of numerous religious sects on gay marriage,
found that many sects actually supported it, and explained why the
152
courts could not pick one religious view over another. The court
could then have assessed whether the ban served some legitimate
interest under rational basis review, or if it served only to express
disapproval of gays. Instead, it turned to heightened scrutiny to
153
invalidate the marriage ban.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has applied “a more searching
form of rational basis review” to laws that show “a desire to harm a

149. Despite the court’s thorough reasoning, Iowa voters either plainly disagreed with the
decision or believed the justices had overstepped their roles in deciding the issue. In the 2010
midterm election, voters recalled all three justices who were up for reelection in an
“unprecedented vote.” A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at A1. Nonetheless, voters and legislators seem uninterested in amending
the state constitution to invalidate the court’s ruling. Jason Hancock, One Year Later, Gay
Marriage Repeal Appears to Be on Backburner, IOWA INDEPENDENT, Apr. 1, 2010, http://
iowaindependent.com/31160/one-year-later-gay-marriage-repeal-appears-to-be-on-backburner.
150. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 877 (Iowa 2009).
151. Id. at 872.
152. Id. at 904–06.
153. See id. at 896 (“Because we conclude Iowa’s same-sex marriage statute cannot
withstand intermediate scrutiny, we need not decide whether classifications based on sexual
orientation are subject to a higher level of scrutiny.”). The Connecticut court also used
heightened (or intermediate) scrutiny. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407,
423 (Conn. 2008). The California court, which does not use an intermediate level of scrutiny, In
re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 435–36 (Cal. 2008), adopted strict scrutiny for classifications
based on sexual orientation, id. at 446. Only Massachusetts applied rational basis review.
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961.
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154

politically unpopular group” —including gays and lesbians in Romer
155
and Lawrence —the Court has never said that sexual orientation is a
156
suspect class. The state courts should have exercised the same
restraint. The Court has adopted a sound principle of state neutrality
toward approving or disapproving of gay persons, and adoption of a
heightened level of scrutiny would topple that balance. To declare
sexual orientation a suspect class would place gays and lesbians in the
same category as racial and ethnic minorities and women, and would
“exacerbate[] the public perception that they are seeking special
157
rights rather than equal rights.” By rejecting that approach, the
Supreme Court wisely has declined to give gays and lesbians as a class
158
the appearance of any legally favored position.
3. New Jersey’s Middle Ground Provides Only a Temporary
Resolution. In contrast to the other courts discussed, the New Jersey
court was eager to strike a balance between the two sides. When
159
faced with the same question as the other courts, the New Jersey
154. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also id. (citing
cases applying the “more searching form” of rational basis review to laws discriminating against
hippies, unmarried persons, and the mentally disabled).
155. See id. (articulating the “more searching” standard in Lawrence and describing the
Court’s holding in Romer).
156. Cf. EVAN GERSTMANN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 69 (2d ed.
2008) (“For all practical purposes the constitutional doctrine regarding suspect classes is a dead
letter. . . . [T]he Court has no intention of creating any new suspect classes.”).
157. Id.; see also id. (arguing that the heightened scrutiny approach carries “political
liabilities” for gays and lesbians, “fram[ing] their arguments in terms of special pleading rather
than legal equality”).
158. This Note does not dispute the notion that sexual orientation may qualify as a suspect
or quasi-suspect classification. There are strong arguments that gay persons and same-sex
couples fit within the Supreme Court’s description of protected class, including arguments in
cases otherwise criticized in this Note. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 443 (rejecting
increased political acceptance as a barrier to heightened review and noting that “if a group’s
current political powerlessness were a prerequisite to a characteristic’s being considered a
constitutionally suspect basis for differential treatment, it would be impossible to justify the
numerous decisions that continue to treat sex, race, and religion as suspect classifications”).
Such recognition, however, would unnecessarily tip the existing balance between state
nondiscrimination and private rights to disapprove. Because the resolution of same-sex
marriage rights need not turn on heightened review, see infra Part III.C.2, granting protected
status in the decisions is particularly unwise.
159. Like the other courts, New Jersey’s court decided the case on summary judgment,
without the benefit of a fully developed record. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 203 (N.J. 2006).
Like other courts, the New Jersey court also relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence, rather than limiting its consideration to its unique state law. See id. at 207 (“In
attempting to discern those substantive rights that are fundamental under Article I, Paragraph
1, we have adopted the general standard followed by the United States Supreme Court in
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court determined that the state constitution required that gay couples
be given all the same rights and benefits of marriage, but declined to
order the legislature to adopt the name “marriage.” In reaching its
decision, the court took pains to describe “[t]he seeming ordinariness
160
of plaintiffs’ lives” —that is, the same as heterosexual couples’—
161
describing, for example, their jobs and family members. It noted the
disconnect between the “ordinariness” of their lives and “the social
indignities and economic difficulties that they daily face due to the
162
inferior legal standing of their relationships.” The court refused to
consider arguments that heterosexual marriage—and not gay
marriage—was for procreation and child rearing, as the attorney
163
general had disclaimed those interests, and accordingly found that
the state had no reason to exclude same-sex couples from the rights
164
and benefits of marriage. But the court also found that history and
tradition did not allow it to declare that the fundamental right to
165
marriage applied to same-sex couples.
Finally, the court determined that, because the state had no
experience with civil unions or other parallel schemes, the court
should not presume that those schemes would violate the state
166
constitution. It reasoned, “A proper respect for a coordinate branch

construing the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution.”).
160. Id. at 202; see also id. at 201 (“In terms of the value they place on family, career, and
community service, plaintiffs lead lives that are remarkably similar to those of opposite-sex
couples.”).
161. Id. at 201–02.
162. Id. at 200. The court also observed that gays and lesbians were fully protected against
discrimination by state law, but only as individuals. See id. (“The statutory and decisional laws
of this State protect individuals from discrimination based on sexual orientation. When those
individuals are gays and lesbians who follow the inclination of their sexual orientation and enter
into a committed relationship with someone of the same sex, our laws treat them, as couples,
differently than heterosexual couples.”).
163. Id. at 205–06, 206 n.7.
164. Id. at 220–21.
165. See id. at 211 (“Despite the rich diversity of this State, the tolerance and goodness of its
people, and the many recent advances made by gays and lesbians toward achieving social
acceptance and equality under the law, we cannot find that a right to same-sex marriage is so
deeply rooted in the traditions, history, and conscience of the people of this State that it ranks as
a fundamental right.”).
166. Id. at 221–22 (“Because this State has no experience with a civil union construct that
provides equal rights and benefits to same-sex couples, we will not speculate that identical
schemes called by different names would create a distinction that would offend Article I,
Paragraph 1. We will not presume that a difference in name alone is of constitutional
magnitude.”).
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of government counsels that we defer until it has spoken. . . . [A]
court must discern not only the limits of its own authority, but also
167
when to exercise forbearance . . . .” It appears the court was staying
out of the real firestorm—and saving the big question of gay marriage
for another day. The decision took a careful balance, in both tone and
result, and was perhaps the wisest path the court could have followed
in the case. But as other cases—culminating in Perry v.
Schwarzenegger—reveal, the separate-but-equal fix is merely a
temporary one, as equal same-sex couples demand to know why they
should be separate at all.
III. TRIAL BY FIRE: RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW IN
PERRY V. SCHWARZENEGGER
Under the neutrality principle constructed by the Supreme
Court, a state may neither adopt a law that exists to disapprove of or
disadvantage gay persons, nor prevent private actors from expressing
their disapproval of homosexuality. As argued in Part I, this principle
strikes a legal balance between two sides in the culture war that
disagree on whether gay persons are socially and morally equal to
straight persons. A significant remaining question is how the
neutrality principle applies to same-sex marriage.
All too often, those debating same-sex marriage have conflated
popular approval and the right of persons—or couples—to act as they
168
choose. The defenders of Proposition 8 claimed that the ban served
the legitimate interest of protecting “the First Amendment rights of
individuals and institutions that oppose same-sex marriage on
169
religious or moral grounds.” But the state-neutrality principle
requires disentangling popular approval and civil rights. As courts
170
have repeatedly recognized, the right to marry is fundamental.

167. Id. at 222–23.
168. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 986 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(“‘Legalizing “same-sex marriage” would convey a societal approval of a homosexual lifestyle,
which the Bible calls sinful and dangerous both to the individuals involved and to society at
large.’” (quoting Pls.’ Ex. 168, Southern Baptist Convention Resolution on Same-sex
Marriage)).
169. Defendant-Intervenors’ Trial Memorandum at 9, Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (No. C 092292-VRW).
170. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (“[T]he decision to marry is a
fundamental right.”); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (“[T]he right to marry is of
fundamental importance to all individuals.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“[T]he
freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the
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Though a state may impose some regulations that apply to all couples
equally, it may not deny a marriage license to a heterosexual couple,
171
absent a compelling justification. As demonstrated in Part II,
however, state courts considering states’ obligations to issue marriage
172
licenses to same-sex couples have come out all over the map.
Almost all of those courts, moreover, have issued decisions based on
173
assumptions and unsatisfactory reasoning.
In this legal landscape, two same-sex couples—represented by
experienced constitutional litigators Ted Olson and David Boies—set
174
out to settle the law under the federal Constitution. The plaintiffs in
Perry v. Schwarzenegger challenged California’s Proposition 8, which
175
amended the state constitution to ban same-sex marriage. On
August 4, 2010, a federal district court struck down the amendment,
finding that the “[p]laintiffs have demonstrated by overwhelming
evidence that Proposition 8 violates their [federal] due process and
equal protection rights and that they will continue to suffer these
constitutional violations until state officials cease enforcement of
176
Proposition 8.”
A. The Road to Perry
The gay marriage dispute in California is a decade-long story,
with Perry as the latest stage. In 1999, the California legislature
adopted a domestic partnership law affording same-sex couples many
177
of the same rights and benefits as married heterosexual couples.
The next year, voters passed Proposition 22, which amended the

orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”); see also Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 992 (“The parties
do not dispute that the right to marry is fundamental.”).
171. See, e.g., Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388 (applying strict scrutiny to a state law withholding
marriage licenses from single parents who were deficient on their child support payments).
172. See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text.
173. See supra Part II.B.
174. See Eskridge & Spedale, supra note 2 (“Adversaries in Bush v. Gore, Ted Olson and
David Boies are a power couple of super-lawyers supporting same-sex marriage. Dismayed that
California voters overrode their state Supreme Court’s guarantee of marriage equality for
lesbian and gay couples, Boies and Olson have brought a federal constitutional lawsuit to
invalidate the voters’ action.”).
175. See California Marriage Protection Act, Proposition 8 (2008) (codified at CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 7.5) (“Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
California.”).
176. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
177. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 413 (Cal. 2008) (describing the history and
protections of the 1999 legislation).
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state’s marriage code to explicitly define civil marriage as the union of
178
one man and one woman. In 2003, the legislature enacted a
comprehensive measure providing gays with all the same rights and
179
benefits, though without the name “marriage.” In 2005 and then
again in 2007, the legislature approved laws recognizing same-sex
180
marriage, both of which Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger vetoed,
claiming the legislature lacked the authority to override Proposition
181
22 without returning it to the voters. Gay marriage advocates turned
to the courts, arguing that separate relationship recognition for gay
182
couples violated the California constitution. The state supreme
183
court agreed, and California began issuing marriage licenses to
184
same-sex couples in June 2008.
Proposition 8 was a voter-driven response to the California
Supreme Court’s holding. While the case was still under
consideration, opponents of same-sex marriage had already begun
preparing a constitutional amendment for the November 4, 2008,
185
ballot. The amendment, Proposition 8, provided in its entirety,
“Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in

178. See California Defense of Marriage Act, Proposition 22 (2000) (codified at CAL. FAM.
CODE § 308.5 (West 2004)) (“Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized
in California.”); see also In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 409–10 (describing voters’ adoption of
Proposition 22).
179. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 414 (describing the purpose and protections of the
2003 legislation).
180. See id. at 410 n.17 (“In 2005 and 2007, the Legislature passed bills that would have
amended [state law] to permit marriage of same-sex couples . . . . The Governor vetoed both
measures.”).
181. See id. (noting that “[i]n returning the 2005 bill to the Assembly without his signature,
the Governor stated he believed that Proposition 22 required such legislation to be submitted to
a vote of the people,” and describing Governor Schwarzenegger’s statements that the issue was
already pending before the California courts).
182. Id. at 398.
183. See id. at 453 (“[W]e determine that the language of [the state statute] limiting the
designation of marriage to a union ‘between a man and a woman’ is unconstitutional and must
be stricken from the statute, and that the remaining statutory language must be understood as
making the designation of marriage available both to opposite-sex and same-sex couples.”).
184. See generally Carla Hall, John M. Glionna & Rich Connell, Finally, the Ritual Is Legally
Theirs, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 2008, at A3 (describing same-sex couples marrying at California
courthouses).
185. See Maura Dolan, Gay Marriage Ban Overturned, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 2008, at A1
(“[T]he scope of the court’s decision could be thrown into question by an initiative already
heading toward the November ballot. The initiative would amend the state Constitution to
prohibit same-sex unions. The campaign over that measure began within minutes of the
decision. . . . Conservative and religious-affiliated groups denounced the decision and pledged to
bring enough voters to the polls in November to overturn it.”).

CHANDERSON IN FINAL.DOC

2011]

3/2/2011 1:25:58 PM

FUTURE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE REVIEW

1445

186

California.” On election day, 52.3 percent of voters approved
187
Proposition 8, and the state stopped issuing marriage licenses to
188
same-sex couples the next day. In the six months between the state
supreme court’s decision and the November 4 vote, approximately
189
eighteen thousand licenses were issued to same-sex couples;
following another trip to the state supreme court, those licenses
190
remain valid. After Proposition 8, however, same-sex couples
seeking to wed in California must now seek domestic partnership
licenses instead.
In May 2009, two same-sex couples applied for and were denied
marriage licenses, and filed suit in federal district court. Unlike the
plaintiffs in state courts, who had argued that the bans violated their
respective state constitutions, the plaintiffs in Perry argued that
Proposition 8 violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying same-sex couples the right
191
to marry and by creating an impermissible classification based on
192
sexual orientation. Remarkably, though the governor and other
state actors were the named defendants, they refused to defend

186. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5.
187. See DEBRA BOWEN, CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER
4, 2008 GENERAL ELECTION 7 (2008), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/
2008_general/index.htm#sov (follow “SOV—Complete” hyperlink) (showing that Proposition 8
passed with 52.3 percent of the vote, with 7,001,084 voters approving the amendment and
6,401,482 voting against it).
188. See Complaint ¶ 29, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (2009) (No. 09-2292),
2009 WL 1490740 (“Since November 5, 2008, same-sex couples have been denied marriage
licenses on account of Prop. 8.”).
189. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 997; Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 121 (Cal. 2009).
190. See Strauss, 207 P.3d at 122 (“Proposition 8 does not apply retroactively and
therefore . . . the marriages of same-sex couples performed prior to the effective date of
Proposition 8 remain valid.”).
191. See Complaint, supra note 188, ¶ 39 (“Prop. 8 impinges on fundamental liberties by
denying gay and lesbian individuals the opportunity to marry civilly and enter into the same
officially sanctioned family relationship with their loved ones as opposite-sex individuals.”). The
Supreme Court has recognized marriage as a fundamental right in numerous cases. See, e.g.,
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (“Although Loving arose in the context of racial
discrimination, prior and subsequent decisions of this Court confirm that the right to marry is of
fundamental importance for all individuals.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
(describing marriage as a “vital personal right[]”).
192. See Complaint, supra note 188, ¶ 42 (“California law treats similarly-situated people
differently by providing civil marriage to heterosexual couples, but not to gay and lesbian
couples. Instead, California law affords them and their families only the separate-but-unequal
status of domestic partnership. . . . By purposefully denying civil marriage to gay and lesbian
individuals, California’s ban on same-sex marriage discriminates on the basis of sexual
orientation.”).
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193

Proposition 8; the state attorney general even agreed with the
194
plaintiffs that the amendment violated the U.S. Constitution. Left
without the state on their side, the principal proponents of
Proposition 8 petitioned to intervene to defend the amendment and
195
were allowed to do so, “provid[ing] a vigorous defense of the
196
constitutionality of Proposition 8” in the state’s absence.
B. The Trial over Proposition 8: Testing Rationality
197

The proceedings in Perry were unlike those in the state courts.
Before the Perry trial began, the defendants alone moved for
summary judgment; the district court denied it, finding that “[t]he
198
parties’ positions . . . raised significant disputed factual questions.”
As a result, in contrast to the state cases’ summary proceedings, Perry
included “significant discovery,” opening and closing statements, and
199
a ten-day adversarial presentation of the evidence.
At trial, the plaintiffs presented a host of witnesses. Nine expert
witnesses—historians,
economists,
psychologists,
a
social
epidemiologist, and a political scientist—testified on the purpose and
meaning of marriage, the effects of same-sex marriage on the
institution of marriage, and the effects of bans on same-sex marriage
200
on same-sex couples and their children. They further testified that
marriage is founded on the affection of two people—not necessarily
201
one man and one woman, that the state has an interest in marriage
202
because it encourages stable households, and that there are no

193. See Perry v. Proposition 8 Official Proponents, 587 F.3d 947, 949 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The
defendant Governor, state administrative officers, and county clerks declined to take any
position on the constitutionality of Prop. 8.”); see also Dolan, supra note 185 (“Gov. Arnold
Schwarzenegger, who previously has vetoed two bills in favor of gay marriage, issued a
statement saying he ‘respects’ the California Supreme Court’s decision and ‘will not support an
amendment to the constitution that would overturn’ it.”).
194. See Proposition 8 Official Proponents, 587 F.3d at 949 (“The defendant California
Attorney General responded that he agreed that Prop. 8 was unconstitutional.”).
195. See id. at 949–50 (“The district court granted an unopposed motion to intervene by the
Official Proponents of Prop. 8 and ProtectMarriage.com—a ballot committee under California
law (together, ‘the Proponents’)—so that they could defend the constitutionality of Prop. 8.”).
196. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 930 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
197. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
198. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 932.
199. Id.
200. See id. at 940–44 (describing the qualifications and testimony of the witnesses).
201. Id. at 933.
202. Id.

CHANDERSON IN FINAL.DOC

2011]

3/2/2011 1:25:58 PM

FUTURE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE REVIEW

1447

relevant differences between same-sex and opposite-sex couples that
203
justify the state separating them for purposes of marriage. The
expert testimony put marriage in its social context: it sought to show
what marriage really is in modern America, challenging the
proponents’ assertion—prominently relied upon by state courts that
204
have upheld same-sex marriage bans —that marriage serves
205
primarily to regulate natural (meaning, heterosexual) procreation.
Seven lay witnesses, including the four plaintiffs (two same-sex
206
couples), also testified for the plaintiffs. While the expert testimony
gave the court social context by describing the general effects of bans
on same-sex marriage, the lay witnesses added the human element,
207
describing the personal effects of Proposition 8 on their lives. The
couples testified in detail about the state-conferred legitimacy that
marriage licenses provide to committed straight couples and about
how that is absent from the parallel domestic partnerships created for
208
gay couples. One of the plaintiff couples described their children,
209
and the other described their plans to have children after marriage.
To illustrate the Proposition 8 proponents’ actual motivations in
pursuing passage of the amendment, the plaintiffs called Hak-Shing
William Tam as an adverse witness to discuss his role in the
210
Proposition 8 campaign. In an organized partnership with the
amendment’s official proponents, Tam distributed information—
particularly to Asian and Pacific Islander communities and through
203. Id. at 934–35.
204. See supra note 120.
205. See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 931–32 (describing proponents’ argument that procreation
is central to marriage).
206. Id. at 938–40. In addition to the four plaintiffs, the lay witnesses were a partner to
another same-sex couple who testified about “her experiences with discrimination and about
how her life changed when she married her wife in 2008”; the mayor of San Diego, a former
opponent of same-sex marriage, who testified about “how he came to believe that domestic
partnerships are discriminatory”; and a gay man who “testified about his experience as a
teenager whose parents placed him in therapy to change his sexual orientation from homosexual
to heterosexual.” Id. at 939–40. The plaintiffs also called an eighth lay witness, an adverse
witness who testified about the Proposition 8 campaign. Id. at 940; see also infra notes 210–13
and accompanying text.
207. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 932–38.
208. See Transcript of Proceedings at 139, ¶¶ 6–9, Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (No. C 092292-VRW), available at http://www.afer.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/Perry-Vol-1-1-11-10.
pdf (describing one couple’s sons); id. at 141, ¶¶ 22–24 (“I want to have a stable and secure
relationship with her that then we can include our children in.”).
209. See id. at 89, ¶¶ 17–18 (“[T]he timeline for us has always been marriage first, before
family.”).
210. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 940.
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the website 1man1woman.net—to encourage votes for the
211
amendment. Some of the information he distributed was that
“homosexuals are twelve times more likely to molest children,” that
gay marriage “will cause states one-by-one to fall into Satan’s hands,”
212
and that gay marriage is related to polygamy and incest. The
sources he cited for this information were the National Association
for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality—a gay-conversion
213
organization—and “the internet.”
The Proposition 8 proponents set out to show that the ban served
a legitimate governmental purpose and was not, contrary to the
plaintiffs’ claims, adopted to discriminate against gay persons. Like
the plaintiffs, the proponents of Proposition 8 were represented by
214
experienced and accomplished constitutional counsel. In opening
statements, the proponents asserted that the evidence would show
that marriage is for procreation and that same-sex marriage would
pose a direct threat to the institution of marriage. The evidence,
however, did not live up to the proponents’ promises. They offered
215
only two witnesses, and the court noted that “[p]roponents’
216
evidentiary presentation was dwarfed by that of plaintiffs.” The
court further noted that the proponents “elected not to call the
majority of their designated witnesses to testify,” and that “[t]he
record does not reveal the reason behind proponents’ failure to call
217
their expert witnesses.”

211. See id. at 937 (summarizing testimony).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See Prop. 8 Trial Defense Attorney: Charles Cooper, MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 12, 2010,
9:24 PM PST), http://www.mercurynews.com/samesexmarriage/ci_14168885 (“A former
Assistant Attorney General during the Reagan administration, Charles Cooper is part of the
same conservative Washington, D.C. legal establishment as Olson. He was enlisted to . . . lead
the legal defense of Prop[.] 8 by the ballot measure’s California sponsors, with assistance from
the Alliance Defense Fund, a group aligned against gay marriage.”).
215. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 945.
216. Id. at 932.
217. Id. at 944. The proponents initially said plans to record the trial made their witnesses
“extremely concerned about their personal safety.” Id. The court noted, however, that the
“potential for public broadcast in the case had been eliminated” well before the proponents’
presentation of their case began, and the proponents still did not call the planned witnesses. Id.
The court further suggested the proponents may have had substantive reasons for withdrawing
some witnesses, noting that the “[p]laintiffs entered into evidence the deposition testimony of
two of proponents’ withdrawn witnesses, as their testimony supported plaintiffs’ claims.” Id.
(emphasis added).
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The two experts that the proponents did call were the founder
and president of the Institute for American Values—a think tank
218
focusing on “marriage, family, and child well-being” —and a
219
The first expert argued that the
professor of government.
recognition
of
same-sex
marriage
would
weaken,
or
220
deinstitutionalize, marriage. He testified that marriage may only be
between one man and one woman and that it exists for the purpose of
221
channeling procreation. Accordingly, he argued that the state has an
interest in differentiating between opposite-sex couples—many of
whom can procreate naturally and choose to do so—and same-sex
222
couples, who cannot procreate naturally. The government professor
223
testified on the relative political power of gays and lesbians,
primarily speaking to the level of scrutiny that the court should
224
employ rather than to the interests furthered by the amendment.
C. The District Court’s Opinion
1. Credibility Determinations. In a social controversy in which
225
passions, stereotypes, and misinformation abound, the factfinder’s
responsibility to make credibility determinations is a crucial
complement to the adversarial system in a court’s quest to discover
the truth. In contrast to the state court opinions, which often relied on
226
the same assumptions thrown around in public discourse, the Perry
trial forced scrutiny of all of the evidence presented, through vigorous
218. Id. at 945.
219. Id. at 950–51.
220. Id. at 934, 949.
221. Id. at 933.
222. See id. at 947 (noting the expert’s assertion that “the primary purpose of marriage is to
‘regulate filiation’”).
223. Id. at 951.
224. See id. at 950–52 (summarizing the testimony of an expert regarding gays’ and lesbians’
political power). Some state courts had held that political power defeats gays’ and lesbians’
claims to suspect-class status. See, e.g., Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 974–75 (Wash.
2006) (“The enactment of provisions providing increased protections to gay and lesbian
individuals in Washington shows that as a class gay and lesbian persons are not powerless but,
instead, exercise increasing political power. . . . We conclude that plaintiffs have not established
that they satisfy the third prong of the suspect classification test.”).
225. See, e.g., Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 982–83 (“Well-known stereotypes about gay men and
lesbians include a belief that gays and lesbians are affluent, self-absorbed and incapable of
forming long-term intimate relationships. Other stereotypes imagine gay men and lesbians as
disease vectors or as child molesters who recruit young children into homosexuality. No
evidence supports these stereotypes.”).
226. See supra Part II.B.
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cross examinations and the court’s thorough assessments of the
witnesses’ credibility. The Federal Rules of Evidence distinguish
between lay-witness and expert testimony. Lay witnesses must have
firsthand knowledge of the subjects of their testimony but need not
227
have specialized or technical knowledge or training. In contrast,
experts need not have firsthand knowledge of the particular subjects
228
on which they testify —that is, their knowledge may be obtained
229
through reports prepared by others —but the Rules require courts to
230
screen an expert’s knowledge and qualifications in his field. The
Rules thus prevent courts from considering mere conjecture by
witnesses who are not qualified to give informed opinions.
The Proposition 8 proponents did not object to the qualifications
231
of any of the plaintiffs’ lay or expert witnesses, and the court found
232
that all of them had presented credible testimony. The plaintiffs, in
contrast, challenged the credibility of both of the proponents’ expert
233
witnesses. Applying the federal standards for expert testimony, the
court held that the proponents’ first witness lacked credibility
234
entirely. The witness, the court found, failed to address alternative
theories of the purpose of marriage that had been offered by other
235
experts and failed to explain the sources or methodology of the

227. See FED. R. EVID. 701 (limiting lay witness testimony to that which is “rationally based
on the perception of the witness, . . . helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony
or the determination of a fact in issue, and . . . not based on scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge”).
228. FED. R. EVID. 702.
229. See FED. R. EVID. 703 (providing that “facts or data . . . may be those perceived by or
made known to the expert at or before the hearing,” but that the material must be “of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field”).
230. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (providing that an expert may testify if “the testimony is based
upon sufficient facts or data, . . . the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods,
and . . . the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case”);
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999) (holding that a court must “make
certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal
experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the
practice of an expert in the relevant field”); see also Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 946–47 (quoting
Kumho Tire and describing the requirements of Rule 702).
231. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 938.
232. See id. (concluding that the “plaintiffs’ lay witnesses provided credible testimony”); id.
at 940 (finding that the “plaintiffs’ experts were amply qualified to offer opinion testimony” and
concluding that their testimony was credible).
233. Id. at 945.
234. Id. at 946 (“Blankenhorn’s testimony constitutes inadmissible opinion testimony that
should be given essentially no weight.”).
235. Id. at 947.
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236

research upon which his opinions were based. The court found that
the expert’s opinion that biological parents provide better families for
children than do non-biological parents was “not supported by the
237
evidence on which he relied,” and that “no credible evidence
supports [the expert’s] conclusion” that the legalization of gay
238
marriage “will lead to the deinstitutionalization of marriage.” The
court pointed out that the witness “opposes marriage for same-sex
couples . . . despite his recognition that at least thirteen positive
consequences would flow from state recognition” of same-sex
239
marriage.
The court likewise discounted most of the testimony offered by
the proponents’ second expert, the professor of government. The
expert was called to testify on popular initiatives and on the political
240
power of gays and lesbians. The court noted the witness’s trial
testimony was “inconsistent with the opinions he expressed before he
was retained as an expert,” and that the witness had conceded that
“gays and lesbians currently face discrimination and that current
241
discrimination is relevant to a group’s political power.” Questioning
by the plaintiffs’ attorneys also revealed that the witness’s knowledge
242
of discrimination against gays and lesbians was limited, and that he
had not reviewed all of the materials he relied upon in his expert
243
report, most of which were provided to him by the Proposition 8
244
proponents’ attorneys. The court therefore found that his “opinions
on gay and lesbian political power are entitled to little weight and
245
only to the extent they are amply supported by reliable evidence.”

236. See id. at 948 (“[N]othing in the record other than the ‘bald assurance’ of
Blankenhorn . . . suggests that Blankenhorn’s investigation into marriage has been conducted to
the ‘same level of intellectual rigor’ characterizing the practice of anthropologists, sociologists
or psychologists.” (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995),
and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999))).
237. Id. The court found “the evidence does not, and does not claim to, compare biological
to non-biological parents.” Id.
238. Id. at 949.
239. Id. at 950.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 952.
242. See generally id. at 951–52 (describing the plaintiffs’ voir dire of the expert).
243. Id. at 952.
244. Id. at 951.
245. Id. at 952.
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2. Rational Basis Review. As described in the preceding Part, a
danger of employing an elevated standard of review to same-sex
marriage bans is that it perpetuates the idea that gay persons are
seeking special rights—through special review standards—rather than
246
legal equality. The Perry court’s thorough opinion articulated a
number of ways in which Proposition 8 would fail heightened
review—for example, as a violation of the plaintiff couples’
fundamental right to marry, or as unjustifiable discrimination based
247
on sex or sexual orientation. The court avoided the heightened
scrutiny dangers, however, by finding that Proposition 8 failed even
248
the lowest standard of review.
After reviewing the evidence and using it to make eighty
249
separate findings of fact,
the court found that—based on
250
“overwhelming evidence” —the amendment’s exclusion of same-sex
couples from marriage failed to serve a legitimate interest even under
251
rational basis review.

246. See supra notes 154–58 and accompanying text.
247. In a novel approach, the court held that because the claimed right was a relational
one—the plaintiffs’ sexual orientation determined the sex of the person they would choose as a
spouse—sexual orientation and sex were intertwined. Discrimination because of one amounted
to discrimination because of the other:
Proposition 8 targets gays and lesbians in a manner specific to their sexual orientation
and, because of their relationship to one another, Proposition 8 targets them
specifically due to sex. Having considered the evidence, the relationship between sex
and sexual orientation and the fact that Proposition 8 eliminates a right only a gay
man or a lesbian would exercise, the court determines that plaintiffs’ equal protection
claim is based on sexual orientation, but this claim is equivalent to a claim of
discrimination based on sex.
Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 996. Discrimination based on sex has long demanded heightened
scrutiny. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–34 (1996) (describing and
applying the heightened standard of review that is used for sex-based classifications). Based on
the evidence presented at trial, the court also determined that discrimination based on sexual
orientation called for strict scrutiny, see Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 997, but did not apply it. See
infra note 248.
248. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 997 (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause renders Proposition 8
unconstitutional under any standard of review. Accordingly, the court need not address the
question whether laws classifying on the basis of sexual orientation should be subject to a
heightened standard of review.”); see also id. at 995 (holding that “Proposition 8 cannot
withstand rational basis review,” nor may it “survive the strict scrutiny required by plaintiffs’
due process claim”).
249. Id. at 938–91.
250. Id. at 1003.
251. Id. at 1002 (“Many of the purported interests identified by proponents are nothing
more than a fear or unarticulated dislike of same-sex couples. Those interests that are legitimate
are unrelated to the classification drawn by Proposition 8.”).
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The amendment’s proponents asserted that Proposition 8 served
252
twenty-three legitimate interests. The district court condensed those
interests into five: reserving marriage for one man and one woman,
guaranteeing that social changes are implemented with caution,
promoting heterosexual parenting over gay parenting, protecting the
rights of opponents of same-sex marriage, and treating same-sex
253
couples differently than heterosexual couples. The court held that
the amendment failed to reasonably advance any legitimate interest
254
the proponents had asserted. The extensive findings of fact earlier
in the opinion helped shape the court’s view of the relevant legal
issues to be determined and the relevance of prior Supreme Court
decisions. In determining the nature of the right to marry, the court
rejected the view that procreation was the dominant purpose of the
255
right. The court further found that substantial changes in gender
roles in society and marriage, both in California and nationwide,
eroded the rationale for barring same-sex couples from marriage:
“[T]he exclusion exists as an artifact of a time when the genders were
seen as having distinct roles in society and in marriage. That time has
256
passed.” The district court explained that the Supreme Court’s
257
holding in Loving v. Virginia, invalidating interracial marriage bans,
should be understood not as speaking exclusively to racial
discrimination, but as showing that greater inclusion need not change
258
the definition of marriage.

252. Defendant-Intervenors’ Trial Memorandum, supra note 169, at 7–8. Many of the
asserted interests were redundant, including several on the general theme of preserving and
strengthening the traditional institution of marriage and emphasizing the procreative elements
of marriage. Two fairly unique interests asserted were “[a]ccommodating the First Amendment
rights of individuals and institutions that oppose same-sex marriage on religious or moral
grounds” and “[u]sing different names for different things.” Id. at 8.
253. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 998.
254. Id. at 1001–02. The court held that Proposition 8 violated both the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 991.
255. See id. at 992 (“Never has the state inquired into procreative capacity or intent before
issuing a marriage license; indeed, a marriage license is more than a license to have procreative
sexual intercourse. . . . The Supreme Court recognizes that, wholly apart from procreation,
choice and privacy play a pivotal role in the marital relationship.” (citing Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965))).
256. Id. at 993.
257. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
258. See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 992 (“[T]he Court recognized that race restrictions,
despite their historical prevalence, stood in stark contrast to the concepts of liberty and choice
inherent in the right to marry.”).
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Taking together its findings of fact and the Supreme Court’s
holdings on the nature of marriage, the Perry court found that “[t]he
right to marry has been historically and remains the right to choose a
spouse and, with mutual consent, join together and form a
259
household.” It concluded that the fundamental right to marry,
properly characterized, must include same-sex couples:
Plaintiffs do not seek recognition of a new right. To characterize
plaintiffs’ objective as “the right to same-sex marriage” would
suggest that plaintiffs seek something different from what oppositesex couples across the state enjoy—namely, marriage. Rather,
plaintiffs ask California to recognize their relationships for what
260
they are: marriages.

Domestic partnerships, the court found, did not satisfy the state’s
obligation to afford same-sex couples the opportunity to marry.
Instead, “domestic partnerships were created as an alternative to
261
marriage that distinguish[es] same-sex from opposite-sex couples.”
The evidence presented allowed the court to analyze the
arguments under the “more searching form of rational basis review”
dictated by Romer and Lawrence, rather than the permissive or
assumption-based review standards employed by the state courts.
Finding no rational connection to any legitimate interest, the Perry
court arrived at the only remaining conclusion: that Proposition 8 was
262
passed to further some illegitimate interest. Early in its opinion, the
court noted that “[t]he state does not have an interest in enforcing
private moral or religious beliefs without an accompanying secular

259. Id. at 993.
260. Id.; cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (“To say that the issue in Bowers
was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put
forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about
the right to have sexual intercourse.” (emphasis added)).
261. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 993 (emphasis added); see also id. at 994 (“The evidence
shows that domestic partnerships do not fulfill California’s due process obligation to plaintiffs
for two reasons. First, domestic partnerships are distinct from marriage and do not provide the
same social meaning as marriage. Second, domestic partnerships were created specifically so
that California could offer same-sex couples rights and benefits while explicitly withholding
marriage from same-sex couples. The evidence at trial shows that domestic partnerships exist
solely to differentiate same-sex unions from marriages. A domestic partnership is not a
marriage . . . .” (citations omitted)).
262. See. id. at 1002 (“Here, the purported state interests fit so poorly with Proposition 8
that they are irrational . . . . What is left is evidence that Proposition 8 enacts a moral view that
there is something ‘wrong’ with same-sex couples.”).
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purpose.” After rejecting the interests asserted by the proponents,
the court found that the amendment could only serve those
illegitimate interests instead. It held that “[t]he evidence shows
conclusively that Proposition 8 enacts, without reason, a private
moral view that same-sex couples are inferior to opposite-sex
264
couples.” Properly relying on the Supreme Court’s statements in
Romer and Lawrence—that animus or protection of certain
traditional moral views, standing alone, are not legitimate interests—
265
the Perry court concluded that Proposition 8 must fall.
Against the backdrop of inclusion, marriage bans, including
Proposition 8, operate as blanket disapprovals of homosexuality. In
Perry,
The evidence at trial regarding the campaign to pass Proposition 8
uncloaks the most likely explanation for its passage: a desire to
advance the belief that opposite-sex couples are morally superior to
same-sex couples. . . . Proposition 8 does nothing more than
enshrine in the California Constitution the notion that opposite-sex
266
couples are superior to same-sex couples.

Although the state cannot endorse such blanket disapproval, the
Perry court explicitly noted that individuals and private groups
remain free to voice whatever moral and religious viewpoints they
267
wish. Accordingly, churches need not perform same-sex marriage
268
ceremonies or recognize the marriages of same-sex couples.
D. The Road Ahead
After the district court’s decision in Perry, the proponents of
Proposition 8 quickly appealed to the Ninth Circuit. They also moved
for a temporary injunction staying the decision, which the Ninth
269
Circuit granted, placing a hold on the issuance of marriage licenses

263. Id. at 930–31.
264. Id. at 1003.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1002–03.
267. The court noted that “as a matter of law, Proposition 8 does not affect the rights of
those opposed to homosexuality or to marriage for couples of the same sex.” Id. at 1001.
Moreover, it “does not affect any First Amendment right or responsibility of parents to educate
their children.” Id. at 1000.
268. Id. at 976–77.
269. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696, 2010 WL 3212786, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 16,
2010) (order granting appellants’ motion to stay).
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to same-sex couples until it could hear the case. Prominent
constitutional law scholars, including Erwin Chemerinsky, raised
serious questions about the proponents’ standing to appeal the
270
decision at all, and the Ninth Circuit ordered the proponents to
271
brief the issue.
Imperial County, California, then moved to
272
intervene as an appellant.
The Ninth Circuit sua sponte ordered an expedited review
273
schedule and heard oral arguments on December 6, 2010. It allowed
two hours of argument, with the first hour dedicated to the issue of
standing and the second devoted to the merits of the constitutional
274
challenge to Proposition 8. During arguments the panel was
particularly focused on why a county might have standing to
challenge an order directing it to issue marriage licenses—an issue of
state, not local, policy. The court held on January 4, 2011, that the
county did not have standing to appeal the district court’s decision as
275
an intervenor, and it certified the issue of the proponents’ standing
276
to the California Supreme Court.
The unique situation presented by California’s refusal to defend
Proposition 8 raises a strong possibility that the Ninth Circuit will
dismiss the case for lack of standing without reaching the merits of
the challenge. Regardless of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, if the Supreme

270. Erwin Chemerinsky, Who Has Standing to Appeal Prop. 8 Ruling?, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
15, 2010, at A30.
271. Perry, 2010 WL 3212786, at *1 (“In addition to any issues appellants wish to raise on
appeal, appellants are directed to include in their opening brief a discussion of why this appeal
should not be dismissed for lack of Article III standing.”).
272. Defendant-Intervenors-Appellants’ Opening Brief at 24–29, Perry, No. 10-16696,
available
at
http://www.equalrightsfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/2010.09.17Defendant-Intervenor-Filing.pdf.
273. Perry, 2010 WL 3212786, at *1.
274. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. 10-16696, 10-16751 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2010) (order
setting oral arguments), available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2010/11/15/
10-16696_10-16751_order.pdf.
275. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16751, slip op. at 13 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2011), available at
http://www.afer.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/9th-Circuit-Imperial-County-Ruling.pdf.
276. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2011) (order
certifying a question to the Supreme Court of California) (inquiring whether, under California
law, proponents have a “particularized interest in the initiative’s validity” or may otherwise
defend Proposition 8 when the state refuses to do so), available at http://www.afer.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/01/AFER-9th-Circuit-Standing-Question.pdf. For a good discussion of the
certified question and the parties’ arguments, see Lyle Denniston, Prop. 8: Battling in New
Arena, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 24, 2011, 11:27 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/01/prop-8battling-in-new-arena.
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Court were to grant certiorari, the thorny standing question would
allow the Court—generally reluctant to reach controversial questions
it does not have to reach—to decide the case on less controversial
grounds, by ruling that none of the proponents have standing to
278
appeal.
Uncertainty about how the Court would dispose of a gaymarriage-ban challenge has long dissuaded gay rights advocates from
launching a direct federal challenge, and some of those advocates
openly displayed skepticism—and even contempt—at the challenge
279
filed in Perry. In deciding Lawrence, the Court left itself an out for
such a challenge, saying that the case “does not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that
280
homosexual persons seek to enter.” But, dicta notwithstanding, the

277. Commentators have projected that Perry will reach the Supreme Court and lawyers on
both sides have not shied away from a Supreme Court challenge. See, e.g., Jesse McKinley, Both
Sides in California’s Gay Marriage Fight See a Long Court Battle Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, June 26,
2010, at A12 (noting that “both sides expect [Perry] to wind its way up the federal judicial food
chain, most likely all the way to the Supreme Court”); Michael C. Dorf, A Federal Judge Strikes
Down California’s Proposition 8: Will the Ruling Ultimately Advance or Retard Civil Rights for
LGBT Americans?, FINDLAW (Aug. 9, 2010), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20100809.html
(“Although some of Judge Walker’s opinion focused on facts and circumstances that are unique
to California, the core logic of the ruling implies that gay and lesbian couples throughout the
country have a federal constitutional right to marry. Thus, should the decision be affirmed by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court will come under
considerable pressure to consider the case.”); Prop. 8 Foes, Backers Look to Supreme Court
Showdown on Gay Marriage, L.A. NOW (Aug. 5, 2010, 7:42 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.
com/lanow/2010/08/prop-8-foes-backers-look-to-supreme-court-showdown-on-gay-marriage.html (“A day after Proposition 8 was thrown out in court, both sides in California’s debate over
gay marriage are focusing on the next fight in a battle that is likely to end up before the U.S.
Supreme Court.”).
278. If the Ninth Circuit or the U.S. Supreme Court determines that the intervenors lack
standing to appeal, the legal status of the district court’s opinion is not crystal clear. Although a
district court’s final judgment stands absent an appeal, the parties disagree on the status of a
decision when the defendants cannot appeal for lack of standing. See Perry, No. 10-16751, slip
op. at 6 n.2 (noting the disagreement between the plaintiffs and the Proposition 8 proponents on
whether the district court’s order would stand if proponents’ appeal was dismissed for lack of
standing).
279. See Eskridge & Spedale, supra note 2 (“This is a brash, bold move to nationalize
marriage equality and raise the stakes of the debate.”). See generally Jim Carlton, Federal Suit
Divides Gay-Marriage Backers, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2009, at A3 (describing gay rights activists’
ambivalence toward the federal challenge); Ted Olson’s Supreme Court Adventure, N.Y. TIMES
ROOM FOR DEBATE (Aug. 18, 2009, 7:00 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/
2009/08/18/ted-olsons-supreme-court-adventure (describing criticism by gay marriage advocates
that the Perry challenge was premature).
280. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
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Court’s analysis in gay rights cases overall indicates that the Court
may be open to a gay marriage challenge—if the facts are right.
In that regard, Perry was a game changer. The extensive
evidentiary record showed the real discrimination endured by gay
couples and their children. More importantly, it showed that the
proponents could muster no believable reason, aside from their
personal religious and moral beliefs, for propagating that
discrimination. Under the state-neutrality analysis the Supreme Court
has laid out, Proposition 8 should plainly fall.
CONCLUSION
For decades, same-sex families have sought the freedom to
marry. Religious and social conservatives, meanwhile, have sought
the freedom to disapprove of homosexuality. The Supreme Court has
struck a laudable balance between these two positions. On both ends,
the Court has ordered the state to stay out of the culture war. The
voluminous evidence presented in Perry revealed that the proponents
of California’s Proposition 8 acted to ban same-sex marriage for no
reason other than to propagate discrimination against gay couples.
Moreover, because a state’s issuance of a civil marriage license is a
governmental—rather than a private or religious—act, that issuance
could not be said to burden individual or organizational rights to
disapprove of homosexuality. Under Romer and Lawrence, the state’s
enforcement of Proposition 8 violates same-sex couples’ rights to due
process and equal protection.
In a well-known quote in Lawrence, the Supreme Court noted
that “times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see
that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to
281
oppress.” If the Court is true to its state-neutrality approach, it will
necessarily follow the lead of the Perry court and allow the
evidence—showing that gay marriage bans have no rational basis—to
carry the day.

281. Id. at 579.

